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Introduction
This thesis covers two main areas of microeconomic theory. The first three chapters
present the results of joint research with Andreas Kleiner, and are contributions to
the theory of mechanism design. The last two chapters contribute to the literature on
general equilibrium in markets with indivisible goods.
First Part, Chapters One to Three
Mechanism design is concerned with the implementability of social choice functions
when agents are privately informed about their preferences. A social choice function is
a rule which specifies how to choose among a given set of alternatives, for each possible
combination of preferences that a population may have over these alternatives. Since
preferences are private information, it is reasonable that the agents will not necessarily
reveal their true preference when asked for it, in order to apply the social choice function.
However, in many situations a mechanism can be designed to solve this problem. A
mechanism specifies the rules of a game such that, if the agents with certain preferences
play an equilibrium of the game, the outcome is precisely that which is prescribed by the
social choice function for these preferences. Then the mechanism is said to be incentive
compatible and to implement the social choice function.
The theory of mechanism design aims at characterizing the set of social choice
functions that are implementable with respect to certain notions of equilibrium, and
then optimizing over this set of functions according to different objective functions and
subject to additional constraints. For example, an auction can be interpreted as a
social choice function and one can ask for the auction that yields the highest revenue,
provided that the participants bid in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. The answer is that the
seller should conduct a second-price auction with a reserve price that depends on how
the seller estimates the bidders’ preferences to be distributed (Myerson 1981).
The first three chapters of this thesis focus on a particular objective function for
the determination of an optimal mechanism, and study it in three different settings. In
each setting, we identify mechanisms that maximize expected residual surplus. This is
the aggregate utility (or welfare) of all agents and therefore explicitly includes monetary
transfers that are possibly needed in order to make the mechanism incentive compatible.
This contrasts most of the literature on mechanism design which does not consider as
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welfare-reducing the transfers that leave the group of agents (sometimes also referred
to as money burning). Underlying the computation of expected residual surplus is
an assumed distribution of preferences which we always require to satisfy monotone
hazard rates. This is a widely used assumption in the mechanism design literature. In
all three chapters we will further require implementation in ex-post equilibrium which
means that the agents’ strategies remain optimal even when they know the preferences
of the other players. This ensures that the mechanisms are robust to informational
disturbances and is helpful in guiding practical decisions on which social choice rule to
pick. Using this approach, we can also explain the prevalence of certain mechanisms in
practice.
Specifically, in the first chapter we look at settings in which a group of agents is
faced with the decision to accept or reject a given proposal. This can be, for instance,
the decision to pass or reject a bill, or whether to hire a new colleague. Every member
of the group has a (privately known) positive or negative willingness-to-pay for the
proposal. While the efficient decision rule would be to accept the proposal if and only
if the average willingness-to-pay is positive, this can only be implemented if transfers
leave the group of agents. Our mechanism design approach of identifying the social
choice rule that maximizes residual surplus establishes that the best mechanism for
this setting is a simple majority voting rule which does not involve transfers at all.
This is in line with the fact that in most practical situations the decision is carried out
without the use of transfers and therefore we provide a rationale for the widespread use
of voting.
The second chapter considers a dynamic version of the above setting. In every pe-
riod, the group of agents has to decide whether to accept or reject a different proposal.
Although we assume that utility is not transferable (i.e., money is not feasible, usu-
ally for ethical or other reasons), a dynamic social choice rule may condition on past
decisions and behavior. This enables the modeling of phenomena like vote trading or
explicit mechanisms like budgeted veto rights. The main insight of this chapter is that
changes of the mechanism in future periods that depend on present behavior affect an
agent’s incentives in the same way as monetary transfers, which are usually used to
align incentives. For example, if an agent exercises his veto right today, he will not
have it in future periods, which changes his expected future utility. This interpretation
of expected future utility as monetary transfers allows us to apply similar techniques
as in the first chapter, and we can derive the main result that the welfare-optimal
dynamic decision rule in every period decides according to the same majority voting
rule. This implies that the outcome of vote trading games or veto rights mechanisms
is welfare-inferior to periodic majority voting.
The third chapter studies the allocation of a private good among two agents in the
context of residual surplus maximization. This is done in two different settings: In
the auction setting, the good does not initially belong to any of the agents. We derive
that any optimal mechanism takes one of two simple forms. Either it is a posted price
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mechanism, where the good is given to one of the agents unless both agents agree to
trade the good at a prespecified strike price. Or it is an option mechanism, where
the good is given to one of the agents and the other agent is given the option to buy
the good from the first agent for a prespecified strike price. The second setting is
bilateral trade, where one agent (the seller) initially owns the good. Here, we can
show that posted price mechanisms are optimal trading mechanisms. Since the optimal
mechanism has a balanced budget, this result shows that in the traditional literature
on bilateral trade, budget-balancedness does not need to be imposed a priori (Myerson
and Satterthwaite 1983, Hagerty and Rogerson 1987).
Second Part, Chapters Four and Five
The second part of this thesis studies the existence and computation of market equilibria
in exchange economies with indivisible goods. In these models, agents from a given
population have quasi-linear preferences over bundles of certain goods as well as money.
A competitive equilibrium (sometimes also called a market equilibrium or Walrasian
equilibrium) consists of a price for each good, such that the market clears when every
agent demands its most-preferred bundle at these prices. Next to the question of the
existence of such a market equilibrium, a central concept for the study of exchange
economies is a taˆtonnement process that adjusts prices until an equilibrium is attained.
Underlying such a process is the idea of a Walrasian auctioneer that changes ask prices
in response to supply and demand (Walras 1874), and indeed taˆtonnement processes
are closely linked to iterative auction formats.
In the context of indivisible goods, a central assumption on the set of possible
preferences is that of gross substitutes. An agent having gross substitutes preferences
views all goods as substitutes for each other, in the sense that, if the price for one of
the goods increases, he will buy (weakly) more of every other good. This assumption
ensures that competitive equilibria always exist in the standard auction environment
(Kelso and Crawford 1982), where a set of items is available for sale to a group of
potential buyers. This environment, as well as the set of possible preferences, have since
then been generalized. For example, the two-sided structure considered in the auction
setting can be extended to a network of trading relationships (Hatfield, Kominers,
Nichifor, Ostrovsky and Westkamp 2013).
The fourth chapter of this thesis provides a generalization of the gross substitutes
condition in this trading network environment. In these economies, agents are located
at nodes in a network and can engage in various trading relationships with their “neigh-
bors” in which they are either the seller or the buyer. Underlying the adjacent trades
are goods over which agents have quasi-linear preferences. We assume that the pref-
erences satisfy the following assumption (gross substitutes and complements, see Sun
and Yang 2006): The set of possible trades can be divided into two sets which can
be thought of as tables and chairs. Agents view goods in one set as substitutes for
each other (so one table substitutes another table), but view goods in different sets
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as complementing each other (so every table complements every chair). We show that
with this class of preferences, a competitive equilibrium always exists and thereby unify
previous generalizations of the Kelso and Crawford model.
By harnessing the interpretation of the gross substitutes condition as a geomet-
ric property of discrete convex functions, the final chapter of this thesis studies the
connections between taˆtonnement processes for economies with indivisible goods and
algorithms for the minimization of discrete convex functions. Specifically, for a valua-
tion function that represents the preferences of an agent, the indirect utility function
can be considered. This is the utility an agent gets if he chooses his most-preferred
bundle, given prices for each good, and mathematically corresponds to the convex con-
jugate of the agent’s valuation function. If the agent has gross substitutes preferences,
then the valuation function as well as the indirect utility function belong to classes of
discrete convex functions with nice combinatorial structure. For these functions, mar-
ket equilibria correspond exactly to the set of prices that minimize aggregate indirect
utility, and steepest descent algorithms can be used to find these prices. Using these
connections, we are able to generalize existing taˆtonnement processes (Ausubel 2006)
to arbitrary exchange economies with agents that are buyers and/or sellers of multiple
units of different goods. These results are applied to obtain price adjustment processes
for the trading network economies treated in the fourth chapter, as well as for models
with gross substitutes and complements preferences.
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Chapter 1
Why Voting? A Welfare Analysis
Voting is commonly applied in collective decision making, but at the same
time it is criticized for being inefficient. We address this apparent conflict
and consider committees deciding collectively between accepting a given
proposal and maintaining the status quo. Committee members are privately
informed about their valuations and monetary transfers are possible. We
solve for the social choice function maximizing utilitarian welfare, which
takes monetary transfers to an external agency explicitly into account. For
regular distributions of preferences, we find that it is optimal to exclude
monetary transfers and to decide by qualified majority voting.
1. Introduction
Why is voting predominant in collective decision making? A common view is that often
it is immoral to use money. This view is plausible, for example, when deciding who
should receive a donated organ or whether a defendant should be convicted. However,
it explains less convincingly why shareholders vote on new directors at the annual
meeting, why managing boards of many companies make important operative decisions
by voting, or why hiring committees vote when deciding on a new appointment. Indeed,
voting is criticized for its inefficiency, and the economic literature argues that collective
decisions can be improved if transfers are used to elicit preference intensities. But
redistributing these transfers within the group introduces incentive problems, while
wasting them reduces welfare. We model these considerations explicitly, and show that
voting maximizes welfare.
Our analysis closely follows standard models of collective decision making: A finite
population of voters decides collectively whether to accept a given proposal or to main-
tain the status quo. Agents are privately informed about their valuations and have
quasi-linear utilities. Monetary transfers are feasible as long as they create no bud-
get deficit and agents are willing to participate in the decision process. In contrast to
much of the literature, we consider a utilitarian welfare function that takes monetary
transfers to an external agency into account. We then investigate which strategy-proof
social choice function maximizes this aggregate expected utility.
Our main result is that the optimal anonymous social choice function is imple-
mentable by qualified majority voting. Under such schemes, agents simply indicate
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whether they are in favor or against the proposal, and the proposal is accepted if the
number of agents being in favor is above a predetermined threshold. This implies that,
even though it is possible to use monetary transfers, it is optimal not to use them.
Specifically, we show that any anonymous decision rule that relies on monetary trans-
fers wastes money to such an extent that it is inferior to voting. It follows that it is
not possible to improve upon voting without giving up reasonable properties of the
social choice function. Our result thereby justifies the widespread use of voting rules
in practice, and provides a link between mechanism design theory and the literature on
political economy.
Our finding that voting performs well from a welfare perspective stands in sharp
contrast to the previous literature, which suggests to implement the value-maximizing
public decision. However, this does not achieve the first-best because it induces budget
imbalances (see, e.g., Green and Laffont 1979). While it is traditionally assumed that
money wasting has no welfare effects, we consider a social planner that cares about
aggregate transfers. This approach seems reasonable for at least two reasons: First,
a social planner might be interested in implementing the decision rule that maximizes
the agents’ expected utility, which in turn depends on the payments they have to make.
Second, groups often choose the rule by which they decide themselves, and when making
this choice they take the payments they have to make into account. Hence, our approach
provides an explanation for which decision rules are likely to prevail in practice.
Our result, that transfer-free voting schemes dominate more complex decision rules,
follows from two basic observations. In a first step, we analyze the transfers that are
necessary to implement a given decision rule. Incentive compatibility fixes the payment
function up to a term that only depends on the reports of all other agents. We show
that the requirements of (a) no money being injected and (b) all agents being willing
to participate in the decision procedure, entirely fix the payment functions for any
anonymous decision rule. In particular, it turns out that if money is necessary to
induce truthful reporting then it has to be wasted. As an application, this implies
that any anonymous social choice function is implementable with a balanced budget
if and only if it can be implemented by qualified majority voting. In a second step,
we then analyze the trade-off between increasing efficiency of the public decision and
reducing the waste of monetary resources. For regular distribution functions, we show
that this trade-off is solved optimally by not using money at all. This implies that the
optimal social choice function is implementable by qualified majority voting. We also
characterize the minimum number of votes that is optimally required for the adoption
of the proposal.
Related Literature
Formal analyses of the question “should we use monetary transfers or not?” are rare;
to the best of our knowledge, the only attempts are arguments that voting mechanisms
are easy and perform well for large populations (Ledyard and Palfrey 2002), and that
voting rules are coalition-proof (Bierbrauer and Hellwig 2012). We complement these
papers by arguing that voting is optimal from a utilitarian perspective.
The fact that the optimal decision scheme does not use transfers relates our work
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to the analysis of optimal collective decision rules when monetary transfers are not
feasible. This literature was initiated by Rae (1969), who compares utilitarian welfare
of different voting rules and shows that simple majority voting (where a proposal is
accepted if at least half of the population votes for it) is optimal if preferences are
symmetric across outcomes. Recently, this approach was generalized to include more
general decision rules (Azrieli and Kim 2012), to allow for correlated valuations (Schmitz
and Tro¨ger 2012) and to consider more than two alternatives (Gershkov, Moldovanu
and Shi 2013).
Barbera and Jackson (2004) study a model where agents not only vote on a given
proposal, but in a first stage decide on which voting rule to use in the second stage.
They argue that only “self-stable” rules, i.e., voting rules that would not be changed
once in place, are likely to prevail. If agents are ex-ante symmetric, only voting rules
that maximize utilitarian welfare satisfy this condition. We contribute to this branch
of the literature by showing that, in our setting, the exclusion of money is not costly.
Our insight that monetary transfers are not necessarily welfare-increasing relates
our work to studies that exclude monetary transfers but allow for costly signaling.
These studies assume that signaling efforts are wasteful and cannot be redistributed.
It is shown that the welfare-maximizing allocation of private goods relies only on prior
information and completely precludes wasteful signaling (Hartline and Roughgarden
(2008), Yoon (2011), Condorelli (2012), Chakravarty and Kaplan (2013); see McAfee
and McMillan (1992) for a result in a similar vein). In contrast, we allow for monetary
transfers from and between agents and show that in a public good setting similar
economic trade-offs arise.
An extensive literature in mechanism design studies allocation problems when mon-
etary transfers are feasible. While VCG mechanisms implement the value-maximizing
public decision (Groves 1973), this comes at the cost of budget imbalances that cannot
be redistributed without distorting incentives (Green and Laffont 1979, Walker 1980).1
Therefore, these mechanisms achieve the first-best only under the assumption that the
social planner does not care about monetary resources. An opposite approach, where
the budget is required to be exactly balanced, is pursued in Laffont and Maskin (1982).
The budget imbalances of VCG mechanisms might be less severe if they were quan-
titatively negligible in practical applications. This argument has been put forward by
Tideman and Tullock (1976), who conjecture that wasted transfers are not important
for large populations2 and VCG mechanisms therefore approximate the first-best. In
Section 4 we discuss how our result relates to this observation.
A small part of the literature, which also considers money burning to be welfare-
reducing, studies the allocation of a private good. Miller (2012) shows that the optimal
mechanism never allocates efficiently and in some cases wastes monetary resources. If
there are only two agents and the distribution functions are regular then the optimal
mechanism transfers money and has a balanced budget (Drexl and Kleiner 2012, Shao
1For an approach using a weaker equilibrium concept see d’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979).
Note that the equivalence between dominant strategy and Bayes-Nash incentive compatible mecha-
nisms established by Gershkov, Goeree, Kushnir, Moldovanu and Shi (2013) does not hold in this
model as the budget is constrained ex-post.
2This claim was formally verified by Green and Laffont (1977).
7
and Zhou 2012). In contrast, the optimal social choice function in the present chapter
does not use money.
Finding the optimal social choice function involves understanding which part of
the payments can be redistributed without distorting incentives (see also the work of
Cavallo 2006). Our focus on anonymous social choice functions for a public good setting
allows us to solve this problem.
We proceed as follows: We present the model in Section 2, derive our main result
in Section 3 and provide a short discussion of the result in Section 4.
2. Model
We consider a population of N agents3 deciding collectively on a binary outcome X ∈
{0, 1}. We interpret this as agents deciding whether they accept a proposal (in which
case X = 1) or reject it and maintain the status quo (X = 0). Given a collective
decision X, the utility of agent i is given by θi ·X + ti, where θi is the agent’s valuation
for the proposal and ti is a transfer to agent i.
4 Each agent is privately informed about
his valuation, which is drawn independently from a type space Θ :=
[
θ, θ
]
according
to a distribution function F with positive density f . To make the problem interesting
we assume that θ < 0 < θ.5 Both type space and distribution function are common
knowledge. Let ΘN denote the product type space consisting of complete type profiles
with typical element θ = (θi, θ−i).
A social choice function in this setting determines for which preference profiles the
proposal is accepted and which transfers are made to the agents. Formally, a social
choice function is a pair G = (XG, TG) consisting of a decision rule
XG : ΘN → {0, 1}
and a transfer rule
TG : ΘN → RN
such that, for any realized preference profile θ, XG(θ) is the decision on the public
outcome and TGi (θ) is the transfer received by agent i. A social choice function is
feasible if, for any realization of preferences, no injection of money from an external
agency is necessary, i.e., if ∑
i∈N
TGi (θ) ≤ 0. (F)
In many situations agents have the outside option to abstain from the decision
process and leave the decision to the other agents. It is then without loss of generality
3For convenience, we also write N for the set of agents {1, . . . , N}.
4Our analysis applies to costless projects as well as to costly projects with a given payment plan,
in which case the valuation of agent i is interpreted as her net valuation taking her contribution into
account. Also note that the analysis accommodates more general utility functions: Take any quasi-
linear utility function such that the utility difference between X = 1 and X = 0 is continuous and
strictly increasing in θi. Redefining the type to equal the utility difference, we can proceed with our
analysis without change.
5The analysis directly extends to cases where θ = −∞ and/or θ =∞.
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to consider social choice functions that ensure participation in the following sense: If
agent i leaves the decision process, the social choice function chooses some alternative
X i(θ−i). Then the social choice function satisfies universal participation (see, e.g.,
Green and Laffont 1979) if, given this outside option, all agents prefer to participate in
the decision process:6
θiX
G(θ) + TGi (θ) ≥ θiXGi (θ−i). (UP)
This constraint is weaker than the requirement that every agent derive utility of at
least zero (often called individual rationality). For instance, majority voting satisfies
universal participation but in general it is not individually rational.
Definition 1. We call a decision rule XG anonymous if it is independent of the agents’
identities, i.e. if, for each permutation pi : N → N and corresponding function pˆi(θ) =
(θpi(1), . . . , θpi(N)), it holds that X
G(θ) = XG(pˆi(θ)) for all θ.
A social choice function is anonymous if the associated decision rule is anonymous.
This is a weak notion of anonymity, requiring only that the names of the agents do
not affect the public decision. However, focusing on anonymous social choice functions is
a potentially severe restriction.7 Nonetheless, it is often reasonable to impose anonymity
as many fairness concepts build on this assumption (e.g., equal treatment of equals).
This requirement also has a long tradition in social choice theory, see for example,
Moulin (1983).8
We are interested in social choice functions that are strategy-proof, i.e., for which
there exists a mechanism and an equilibrium in dominant strategies for the strategic
game induced by this mechanism such that, for any realized type profile, the equilib-
rium outcome corresponds to the outcome that the social choice function stipulates.
Requiring social choice functions to be strategy-proof is a standard approach in social
choice theory (see, e.g., Moulin 1983).9
Throughout the chapter we focus on anonymous and feasible social choice functions
that are strategy-proof and satisfy universal participation. Which social choice function
should a utilitarian planner choose? Given that the value-maximizing decision cannot
be implemented with a balanced budget, a utilitarian planner should implement the
6We note that our analysis does not depend on any particular form of the function Xi. This
outside option could also depend on the privately observed valuation of agent i without any change in
the analysis.
7For example, it excludes the use of “sampling Groves mechanisms” (Green and Laffont 1979),
where a VCG mechanism is used for a subset of the population and the budget surplus is redistributed
to non-sampled agents.
8Note that this assumption would be without loss of generality if we allowed for stochastic decision
rules. Given any social choice function (XG, TG), apply this function after randomly permuting the
agents. This defines a new social choice function (X˜G, T˜G) that is anonymous and achieves the same
utilitarian welfare. While this new rule treats all agents equally ex-ante, it is possible that agents
with the same valuations are treated very differently after the uncertainty about the randomization is
resolved.
9Bierbrauer and Hellwig (2012) show for the model we consider that strategy-proofness is equivalent
to robust implementation in the spirit of Bergemann and Morris (2005).
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second-best, i.e., maximize utilitarian welfare given by
U
(
XG, TG
)
:= Eθ
[
N∑
i=1
[
θiX
G(θ) + TGi (θ)
]]
,
where the expectation is taken with respect to the prior distribution of θ. The as-
sumption that the planner perfectly knows the prior distribution of types, although
being very common in the literature on mechanism design, might be too strong in some
settings. Note however, that the optimal social choice function derived in Theorem 1
does not depend on the exact distribution of types. Moreover, as we focus on robust
implementation, misspecifications do not affect incentives and hence the performance
of the optimal social choice function is not very sensitive to slight misestimations of the
distribution of types.
3. Results
To implement a given social choice function, we invoke the revelation principle (Gibbard
1973). It follows that we can focus without loss of generality on direct revelation
mechanisms in which it is a dominant strategy for agents to report their valuations
truthfully. Hence, a mechanism is given by a tuple (x, t), where x : ΘN → {0, 1}
maps reported types into a collective decision and, for each agent i, ti : Θ
N → R maps
reported types into the payment received by that agent. The requirement that a social
choice function be strategy-proof translates to
θix(θi, θ−i) + ti(θi, θ−i) ≥ θix(θˆi, θ−i) + ti(θˆi, θ−i) for all θ−i, θi, θˆi. (IC)
A mechanism is qualified majority voting (with threshold k), if x(θ) = 1 if and only
if |{i : θi ≥ 0}| ≥ k and if in no case monetary transfers are made, i.e., ti(θ) = 0 for all
i and θ.
Definition 2. A distribution function F has monotone hazard rates if the hazard rate
f(θi)
1−F (θi) is non-decreasing in θi for θi ≥ 0 and the reversed hazard rate
f(θi)
F (θi)
is non-
increasing in θi for θi ≤ 0.
This assumption is well-known from the literature on optimal auctions and procure-
ment auction design; it is satisfied by many commonly employed distribution functions,
for example by the uniform, (truncated) normal, and exponential distributions.
We are now ready to state our main result.
Theorem 1. Suppose F has monotone hazard rates. Then the optimal social choice
function is implementable by qualified majority voting with threshold dke, where
k :=
−N E[θi| θi ≤ 0]
E[θi| θi ≥ 0]− E[θi| θi ≤ 0] .
That is, the optimal decision rule does not rely on monetary transfers at all and can
be implemented using a simple indirect mechanism where each agent indicates whether
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she is in favor of or against the proposal. It is accepted if more than dke voters are
in favor.10 The following example illustrates how voting mechanisms compare to the
first-best and the best VCG mechanism.
Example 1. Let N = 2 and θi be independently and uniformly distributed on [−3, 3] for
i = 1, 2. If valuations were publicly observable the first-best could be implemented, which
would yield welfare UFB =
1
2
E[θ1 + θ2 | θ1 + θ2 ≥ 0] = 1. The best VCG mechanism is
the pivotal mechanism, which gives welfare UV CG =
1
2
(see the Appendix). In contrast,
unanimity voting, that is, accepting the proposal if and only if both agents have a positive
valuation, yields welfare UUV =
1
4
E[θ1 + θ2 | θ1 ≥ 0, θ2 ≥ 0] = 34 . Hence, the welfare loss
due to private information is twice as large under the best VCG mechanism as compared
to unanimity voting.
The broader implications of Theorem 1 are discussed in Section 4 and a formal proof
is provided in the Appendix. In the following, we build some intuition for this result.
As a first step, Lemma 1 characterizes direct mechanisms that are strategy-proof. It
shows that the transfer of every type is determined by the decision rule up to a term that
only depends on the reports of the other agents. Since this term changes the transfers
of an agent without affecting his incentives, we call it “redistribution payment.”
As a second step, we show that, for any anonymous social choice function, positive
redistribution payments are not feasible and therefore all collected payments have to be
wasted (Lemma 2). In general, it is easy to build strategy-proof and budget-balanced
social choice functions by ignoring one agent in the public decision and awarding him
all payments by the other agents. Anonymity not only rules out this possibility, but one
can prove that any mechanism which has positive redistribution payments is necessarily
asymmetric.
Given that money cannot be redistributed in anonymous social choice functions,
there is a direct trade-off between improving the decision rule and reducing the outflow
of money. We show, as a third step, that this conflict is resolved optimally in favor
of no money burning. To gain some intuition, fix a type profile of the other agents,
θ−i. Strategy-proofness implies that there is a cutoff θ∗i such that the proposal will be
accepted if the type of agent i is above θ∗i . To solve for the optimal decision rule we
need to find the optimal cutoff. Assume that the sum of valuations
∑
j 6=i θj + θ
∗
i is
negative. Marginally increasing the cutoff leads to a rejection of the proposal which in
this case increases efficiency (with a positive effect on welfare proportional to f(θ∗i )).
On the other hand, strategy-proofness implies that agents with a type above the cutoff
make a payment equal to the cutoff. Increasing the cutoff increases these payments
(with a corresponding negative effect on welfare proportional to 1− F (θ∗i )). Monotone
hazard rates imply that if the positive effect outweighs the negative effect at θ∗i and
therefore it is beneficial to marginally increase the cutoff, then it is optimal to set the
cutoff to the highest possible value. Symmetric arguments imply that it is optimal to
set all cutoffs either equal to zero or to the boundary of the type space, and hence that
the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a voting rule.
Finally, the optimal number of votes required in favor of a proposal is given by
the smallest integer number k such that the expected aggregate welfare of a proposal,
10See also Nehring (2004), Barbera and Jackson (2006).
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given that k out of N voters have a positive valuation, is positive. Hence, the optimal
threshold required for qualified majority voting depends on the conditional expected
values given that the valuation is either positive or negative. Simple majority voting
is optimal if valuations are distributed symmetrically around 0. If, however, opponents
of a proposal are expected to have a stronger preference intensity, then it is optimal to
require a qualified majority that is larger than simple majority.
As an easy consequence, Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 permit a characterization of the
set of strategy-proof social choice functions that have a balanced budget.
Corollary 1. A feasible and anonymous social choice function satisfying universal
participation has a balanced budget if and only if it is implementable by qualified majority
voting.
In comparison to this corollary, Theorem 1 allowed for a larger class of social choice
functions that potentially waste money. While we determine the optimal social choice
function in this larger class in the theorem, this corollary characterizes any imple-
mentable social choice function in the smaller class of budget-balanced social choice
functions. A closely related result has been obtained by Laffont and Maskin (1982),
who in addition require weak Pareto efficiency but do not impose participation con-
straints.
4. Discussion
This chapter shows that utilitarian welfare, which takes transfers into account, is max-
imized by using qualified majority voting. Our result resolves the apparent conflict
between the widespread use of such mechanisms in practice and the intuition that ac-
counting for preference intensities can improve collective decisions. In particular, we
show that the costs of accounting for preference intensities outweigh the benefits and
the VCG mechanism is inferior to voting. In contrast, Tideman and Tullock (1976)
argue that payments vanish as the number of agents gets large and hence the VCG
mechanism should be used instead of voting. However, while it is generically true that
the VCG mechanism approximates the first-best if the population is large enough, this
is not sufficient for being superior to voting. In fact, voting also approximates the first-
best. Moreover, for any fixed population, it turns out that voting provides a higher
expected welfare. More generally, Theorem 1 indicates that being welfare-inferior to
voting is not a problem of the VCG mechanism, but that it is in fact not possible to
improve upon voting under the normative requirements of robust implementation and
equal treatment of equals.
Classical social choice theory suggests that decisions should depend on the average
willingness-to-pay in the population, i.e., a proposal should be accepted if the average
willingness-to-pay is positive. In contrast, decision rules considered in political economy
and implemented in practice typically depend only on the number of agents with a
positive willingness-to-pay. By taking an optimal mechanism design approach we are
able to reconcile mechanism design theory with social choice practice and the literature
on political economy.
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An important question in this respect concerns the robustness of our results to
alternative specifications of the decision problem. First, if one considers more general
problems with more than two possible outcomes, the results will crucially depend on
the restrictions imposed on preferences.11 Second, it would be interesting to relax some
of the restrictions we imposed on the social choice functions. While it appears that
relaxing universal participation does not change the spirit of our results, our analysis
depends crucially on the assumption of anonymity.
Appendix
Verification of Example 1. Welfare of the pivot mechanism can be expressed as the
difference between the welfare of the first-best and the transfers needed to implement
the efficient decision:
UV CG = UFB − 4
36
∫ 0
−3
∫ −θ1
0
(−θ2) dθ2 dθ1 = 1
2
Here, we used the fact that transfers are symmetric in the four regions {θ | θi ≥ 0, θj ≤
0, θi + θj Q 0} and zero everywhere else.
The following lemma is a standard characterization of strategy-proof mechanisms.
Lemma 1. A mechanism is strategy-proof if and only if, for each agent i,
1. x(θi, θ−i) is non-decreasing in θi for all θ−i and
2. there exists a function hi(θ−i), such that for all θ,
θix(θi, θ−i) + ti(θi, θ−i) = hi(θ−i) +
∫ θi
0
x(β, θ−i)dβ. (1)
Equation (1) suggest the following definition:
Definition 3. Agent i is pivotal at profile θ, if θix(θ) 6=
∫ θi
0
x(β, θ−i)dβ.
A necessary condition for agent i to be pivotal at θ is that x(θ) 6= x(0, θ−i). If agent
i is not pivotal at a given profile (θi, θ−i) then her payment equals hi(θ−i). If she is
pivotal at this profile, her transfer is reduced by θix(θ)−
∫ θi
0
x(β, θ−i)dβ.
Lemma 2. Suppose a mechanism (x, t) is anonymous. Then hi(θ−i) = 0 for all i and
θ−i.
Proof. The proof consists of two steps.
Step 1: For all i and θ−i, there exists θi such that no agent is pivotal at (θi, θ−i).
Note that all agents that are pivotal at profile θ submit reports of the same sign: If
x(θ) = 1 then monotonicity implies that x(0, θ−i) = 1 for all agents i with θi < 0 and
hence only agents with positive reports can be pivotal (and similarly for x(θ) = 0).
11For example, for quadratic utilities and a continuum of alternatives, the efficient allocation rule
can be implemented with a balanced budget (Groves and Loeb 1975).
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Fix an arbitrary agent i and a report profile θ−i ∈ ΘN−1. Suppose without loss
of generality that x(0, θ−i) = 1 and that all agents that are pivotal at (0, θ−i) submit
positive reports (if no agent is pivotal at this profile, we are done; if x(0, θ−i) = 0
analogous arguments hold). We show that no agent is pivotal at profile θ := (θj∗ , θ−i),
where j∗ ∈ arg maxj θj. Monotonicity implies that x(θ) = x(0, θ−i) = 1 and hence
agent i is not pivotal. Anonymity implies that agent j∗ is not pivotal. The claim is
proved if we can show that if j is not pivotal at θ and θj′ ≤ θj, then j′ is not pivotal
at θ. Assume to the contrary that j′ is pivotal at θ, i.e. x(θ) = 1 and x(0, θ−j′) = 0.
If pˆij,j′ : Θ
N → ΘN is the function permuting the j-th and j′-th component, then
pˆij,j′ [(0, θ−j)] ≤ (0, θ−j′). From monotonicity it follows that x (pˆij,j′ [(0, θ−j)]) = 0 and
symmetry implies that x(0, θ−j) = 0, contradicting the assumption that j is not pivotal
at θ.
Step 2: For all i and θ−i we have hi(θ−i) = 0.
Universal participation immediately implies that an agent with valuation 0 gets a
weakly positive utility, i.e., 0 ·x(0, θ−i)+ti(0, θ−i) ≥ 0. This implies hi(θ−i) ≥ 0 for all i,
θ−i. To obtain a contradiction, suppose that there exists an agent j and a report profile
θ−j ∈ Θ−j such that hj(θ−j) > 0. By step one, we can choose θj such that no agent is
pivotal at θ := (θj, θ−j), implying by (1) that
∑
i ti(θ) =
∑
i hi(θ−i) > 0, contradicting
(F).
The following lemma shows how utilitarian welfare of a social choice function can
be expressed as the sum of two terms. The first only depends on the allocation rule,
and the second consists of the redistribution payments.
Lemma 3. Let (x, t) be an incentive compatible direct mechanism for social choice rule
G = (XG, TG) and define
ψ(θi) =
{ −F (θi)
f(θi)
if θi ≤ 0,
1−F (θi)
f(θi)
otherwise.
(2)
Then we have
U(XG, TG) =
∫
ΘN
[∑
i∈N
ψ(θi)
]
x(θ)dFN(θ) +
∑
i∈N
∫
ΘN−1
hi(θ−i)dFN−1(θ−i).
Proof. Note that for all θ−i,∫ θ
θ
[∫ θi
0
x(β, θ−i)dβ
]
f(θi)dθi
=
∫ θ
0
x(β, θ−i)dβ F (θ)︸︷︷︸
=1
−
∫ θ
0
x(β, θ−i)dβ F (θ)︸︷︷︸
=0
− ∫ θ
θ
x(θi, θ−i)F (θi)dθi
=
∫ θ
0
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
x(θi, θ−i)dF (θi) +
∫ 0
θ
−F (θi)
f(θi)
x(θi, θ−i)dF (θi)
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=∫ θ
θ
ψ(θi) x(θi, θ−i)dF (θi), (3)
where the first equality follows from integrating by parts, the second from rearranging
terms and the third from the definition of Ψ.
Now rewrite
U(XG, TG) =
∫
ΘN
∑
i∈N
[
θix(θ) + ti(θ)
]
dFN(θ)
=
∑
i∈N
∫
ΘN−1
∫ θ
θ
[∫ θi
0
x(β, θ−i)dβ + hi(θ−i)
]
dF (θi)dF
N−1(θ−i)
=
∫
ΘN
[∑
i∈N
ψ(θi)
]
x(θ)dFN(θ) +
∑
i∈N
∫
ΘN−1
hi(θ−i)dFN−1(θ−i),
where the first equality follows by definition, the second from Lemma 1 and the third
by plugging in equation (3).
For any subset S ⊆ N of the agents, define the corresponding orthant as OS = {θ ∈
ΘN | θi ≥ 0 if i ∈ S, θi ≤ 0 if i /∈ S}.
Lemma 4. Suppose that ψ(θ) is non-increasing in θ and
∫
ψ(θ)dFN(θ) <∞. Let OS
be the orthant corresponding to some subset of agents S. Then the problem
max
x
∫
OS
ψ(θ) · x(θ)dFN(θ)
s. t. x is non-decreasing in θ
0 ≤ x(θ) ≤ 1
is solved optimally either by setting x∗(θ) = 1 or x∗(θ) = 0.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that there exists a function xˆ(θ) that achieves a strictly
higher value. Let ai := inf{θi | (θi, 0−i) ∈ OS}, bi := sup{θi | (θi, 0−i) ∈ OS} and define
x(1)(θ1, θ−1) := 1F (b1)−F (a1)
∫ b1
a1
xˆ(β, θ−1)dF (β). This function is constant in θ1, feasible
for the above problem given that xˆ is feasible and, by Chebyshev’s inequality, for all
θ−1, ∫ b1
a1
ψ(θ1, θ−1)xˆ(θ1, θ−1)dF (θ1)
≤
∫ b1
a1
ψ(θ1, θ−1)dF (θ1)
1
F (b1)− F (a1)
∫ b1
a1
xˆ(θ1, θ−1)dF (θ1)
=
∫ b1
a1
ψ(θ1, θ−1)x(1)(θ1, θ−1)dF (θ1).
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Since this inequality holds point-wise, we also have∫
OS
ψ(θ)xˆ(θ)dFN(θ) ≤
∫
OS
ψ(θ)x(1)(θ)dFN(θ).
Iteratively defining x(j)(θj, θ−j) = 1F (bj)−F (aj)
∫ bj
aj
x(j−1)(β, θ−j)dF (β) for j = 2, . . . , N
we get a function x(N)(θ) that is constant in θ. Repeatedly applying Chebyshev’s
inequality along every dimension, we get∫
OS
ψ(θ)xˆ(θ)dFN(θ) ≤
∫
OS
ψ(θ)x(N)(θ)dFN(θ).
Since the objective function is linear in x, the constant function x(N) is weakly domi-
nated by either x∗ ≡ 1 or x∗ ≡ 0, contradicting the initial claim.
Proof of Theorem 1. Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 together imply that for any anonymous
social choice function G = (XG, TG) it holds that
U(XG, TG) =
∫
ΘN
[∑
i∈N
ψ(θi)
]
x(θ)dFN(θ),
where ψ is defined in (2) and x is the decision rule of the corresponding strategy-proof
direct revelation mechanism. Lemma 4 then implies that the optimal allocation rule is
constant and equal to 0 or 1 in each orthant. Symmetry of the problem implies that
the optimal choice depends only on the number of agents with positive types.
Hence, it remains to determine the optimal cutoff for qualified majority voting. Let
k solve
kE[θi | θi ≥ 0] + (N − k)E[θi | θi ≤ 0] = 0.
Then the expected aggregate valuation, given that k′ < k agents are in favor of the
proposal, is negative. Therefore, it is optimal to accept the proposal if and only if at
least dke agents have a positive valuation.
Proof of Corollary 1. Lemma 2 implies that for any social choice function satisfying
the requirements of the corollary, one cannot redistribute money back to the agents.
Lemma 1 then implies that any budget balanced social choice function must be constant
in each orthant. Monotonicity and anonymity then imply that these social choice
functions can be implemented by qualified majority voting.
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Chapter 2
Preference Intensities in Repeated
Collective Decision-Making
We study welfare-optimal decision rules for committees that repeatedly take
a binary decision. Committee members are privately informed about their
payoffs and monetary transfers are not feasible. In static environments,
the only strategy-proof mechanisms are voting rules which are inefficient as
they do not condition on preference intensities. The dynamic structure of
repeated decision-making allows for richer decision rules that overcome this
inefficiency. Nonetheless, we show that often simple voting is optimal for
two-person committees. This holds for many prior type distributions and
irrespective of the agents’ patience.
1. Introduction
Simple voting rules are known to be inefficient when a majority with weak preferences
outvotes a minority with strong preferences. For instance, if ten out of one hundred
citizens of a village are willing to pay $20 for changing a law, but the rest has a
willingness-to-pay of $1 for keeping the old one, votes would be 90 to 10 against the
new law, although it would be efficient to pass it.
Money could be used as a tool to elicit preference intensities and thereby to imple-
ment the efficient allocation, but in many situations there are moral or other consid-
erations that prevent the use of monetary means. Instead, this chapter examines the
possibilities of using the dynamic structure of environments where group decisions have
to be made repeatedly in order to provide incentives for truthful preference revelation.
In fact, repeated decision problems are ubiquitous in everyday life, ranging from exam-
ples in parliament to hiring committees. In these environments, it is sensible to assume
that agents will not proceed myopically from period to period and therefore will not
vote sincerely. As Buchanan and Tullock (1962) emphasize, “any rule must be analyzed
in terms of the results it will produce, not on a single issue, but on the whole set of
issues.” Consequently, it is not only reasonable to look at equilibrium behavior under
a specific decision rule, but to search for rules that maximize a given objective like, for
example, the welfare of the agents.
Consider the following example, which illustrates the possibility of increasing sen-
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sitivity to preference intensities: Assume that the decision rule prescribes to accept if
at least one of two agents is in favor of the project, unless the other agent uses one
of his limited possibilities to exercise a veto. In this situation, agents are faced with
a trade-off between the current and future periods. If an agent exercises a veto now,
the decision rule decides in her favor, but at the cost of fewer possibilities to use a
veto in the future, which reduces the agent’s continuation value. Intuitively, agents
will use their veto right only if their preference against the proposed project exceeds
some threshold. This has the effect that more refined information about the agents’
preferences is elicited and potentially a more efficient allocation can be implemented.
Given these ideas, the question is why we see so many decision rules that use simple
majority voting in every period, and, more generally, which decision rule is the best in
terms of providing the highest welfare to the agents. In this chapter, we tackle the latter
question and show that, surprisingly, voting rules are optimal among many reasonable
decision rules. This provides a hint to the answer for the former question on why voting
is used so universally.
More specifically, we analyze a model with two agents who are repeatedly presented
a proposal that they need to either accept or reject. Each agent has a positive or
negative willingness-to-pay for accepting the proposal, which is private information and
drawn from a distribution function. Due to the revelation principle, we focus on direct
mechanisms that simply map past preferences and decisions, and preferences in the
current period, into a probability of accepting the current proposal. This allows for the
modeling of many conceivable decision rules. We require that decision rules be incentive
compatible, so that reporting preferences truthfully is a periodic ex-post equilibrium.
This means that in any period, given any history, it is a dominant strategy to report
the preference truthfully. This requirement renders incentives robust to uncontrolled
changes in the information structure as well as deviations of the other player.
We provide a characterization of incentive compatible decision rules in terms of the
allocation in a given period and the continuation values the rule promises. Viewing the
continuation values as a substitute for money enables us to treat any given decision rule
as a static mechanism which can then be improved upon while preserving incentives.
The new continuation values of the improved static mechanism can then be implemented
by specifying a new dynamic decision rule. As a result, we are able to show that if
the preference distributions satisfy an increasing hazard rate condition, then voting
rules are optimal within two classes of mechanisms. First, they are optimal among
decision rules that satisfy unanimity, i.e., rules that never contradict the decision that
both agents would unanimously agree on. This is a reasonable robustness requirement
since one could expect that the agents will not adhere to the decision rule if they
unanimously agree to do something else. Second, if the type distributions are neutral
across alternatives, i.e., the density is symmetric around zero, then voting rules are also
optimal among all deterministic decision rules.
Therefore, if the type distributions are neutral across alternatives, we get the sum-
marizing result that any decision rule yielding higher welfare than every voting rule has
both weaknesses of not satisfying unanimity and not being deterministic. This provides
a strong rationale for the use of voting rules in the setting we consider and also provides
hints on why rules other than voting are not considered in settings with more agents
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either.
Relation to the Literature
We build upon literature studying decision rules for dynamic settings. Buchanan and
Tullock (1962, page 125) note that
much of the traditional discussion about the operation of voting rules seems
to have been based on the implicit assumption that the positive and negative
preferences of voters for and against alternatives of collective choice are of
approximately equal intensities. Only on an assumption such as this can the
failure to introduce a more careful analysis of vote-trading through logrolling
be explained.
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) proceed to analyze vote trading. They argue that
agents can benefit if they trade their vote on a decision for which they have a weak
preference intensity, and in turn get a vote for a future decision. However, it has early
been noted that a trade in votes, while being beneficial for the agents involved, might
actually reduce aggregate welfare of the whole committee, a fact sometimes called “the
paradox of vote trading” (Riker and Brams 1973). A formal analysis of vote trading has
been missing until recently, when Casella, Llorente-Saguer and Palfrey (2012) examined
in a competitive equilibrium spirit a model of vote trading. They show that vote trading
can actually increase welfare in small committees, but is certain to reduce welfare for
committees that are large enough.
Instead of relying on agents playing an equilibrium with non-sincere voting so that
they can express their preference intensities, one can design specific decision rules that
explicitly take intensities into account. Casella (2005) is the first to take this approach in
a dynamic setting, in which agents repeatedly decide on a binary choice. He proposes the
concept of storable votes: In each period, each agent receives an additional vote and can
use some of his votes for the current decision or, alternatively, he can store his additional
vote for future usage. By shifting their votes inter-temporally, agents can concentrate
their votes on decisions for which they have a strong preference. Casella (2005) shows
that this procedure increases welfare of the committee if there are two members and
conjectures that in many circumstances this also holds for larger committees. Hortala-
Vallve (2012) analyzes a similar proposal for a static setting (meaning that agents are
completely informed about their preferences in all decision problems when making the
first decision), in which agents face a number of binary decisions.
Going one step further, one can systematically look for the “best” decision rule.
Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) take a mechanism design approach and show that
for a static setting the efficient outcome can be approximated even in the absence of
money, by linking a large number of independent copies of the decision problem. This
result extends to dynamic settings, as long as individuals are arbitrarily patient. This
surprising result hinges critically on a number of strong assumptions: each decision
problem has to be an identical copy, the designer is required to have the correct prior
belief, agents need to be arbitrarily patient and their beliefs about other agents have
to be identical to the common prior. In an attempt to find more robust decision rules,
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Hortala-Vallve (2010) characterizes the set of strategy-proof decision rules for a static
problem. Given that strategy-proofness is a strong requirement in multi-dimensional
settings, it is not too surprising that voting rules are the only decision rules that satisfy
this restriction.
In contrast, our focus on periodic ex-post equilibrium implies that on the one hand,
the set of implementable decision rules is very rich, but on the other hand our results
are robust and the optimal mechanism is bounded away from attaining the first-best.
The chapter is structured as follows: In Section 2 we present our model in detail.
The results are presented in Section 3 and discussed in Section 4. Some proofs are
omitted from the main text and relegated to the appendix.
2. Model
There are two agents who are repeatedly faced with a proposal and have to accept or
reject each proposal. Periods are indexed by t = 0, 1, ... ∈ T = N. The type of an
agent i in a given period t is denoted by θit and indicates his willingness-to-pay for the
proposal. Type spaces and distribution functions are the same for each period and each
agent, denoted by Θi and F respectively, and types are drawn independently across
time and agents. We denote by θ˜it the random variable corresponding to the type of
agent i, and by θt a type profile which is an element of the product type space Θ.
In each period, a decision xt ∈ {0, 1} has to be made. We denote the sequence of
decisions up to period t by xt, and similarly for a sequence of types θti . Accordingly, for
an infinite sequence we write xT .
Mechanisms
In this model a dynamic version of the revelation principle holds (Myerson (1986), for
similar arguments see Pavan, Segal and Toikka (2008)), hence we can focus on truthfully
implementable direct revelation mechanisms.
Definition 1. A mechanism χ is a sequence of decision rules {χt}t∈T that map past
decisions and type profiles into a distribution over decisions in the current period:
χt : Θ
t × {0, 1}t−1 → [0, 1].
Preferences
Agents have linear von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions and there are no mone-
tary payments. Given a period t and a decision xt for this period, the utility of agent i
with type θit is vit(θit, xt) = θitxt. Agents discount the future with the common discount
factor δ ∈ [0, 1). Consequently, utility of agent i with type sequence θTi is
Vi(θ
T
i , x
T ) =
∑
t∈T
δtθitxt
for the decision sequence xT .
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Equilibrium Concept and Incentive Compatibility
In every period t, agent i learns about his preference type θit, which is his private
information, and then sends a report rit. The history known to the designer in period
t, ht = (xt−1, rt−1), consists of past decisions and past reports.
Given a mechanism χ, we can write the value function for agent i:
Wi(h
t, θt) = sup
rit∈Θi
θitχt(h
t, rit, θ−it) + δEΘt+1Wi(ht+1, θ˜t+1) (1)
Here, ht+1 is the history in the next period, consisting of χt(h
t, rit, θ−it) and (rit, θ−it)
appended to ht. The valuation function specifies, given any history ht, and the current
type profile θt, the highest utility the agent can possibly obtain for some report rit,
assuming that she reports optimally in the future and the other agents report truthfully.
Given a specific history ht, the mechanism χ induces an allocation rule and continuation
functions which we will denote
xt(θt) = χt(h
t, θt) and
wit(θt) = δEΘt+1Wi(ht+1, θ˜t+1).
If the current period is clear from the context, we will also drop the subscript t. The pair
(xt, wt) is called the stage mechanism after history ht and we say that wt is generated by
the mechanism χ. A stage mechanism is admissible if it is generated by some mechanism
χ.
Definition 2. A mechanism is periodic ex-post incentive compatible (IC) if for every
period t and for all histories ht the following holds: For every θ−i and every θi we have
that
θitx(θit, θ−it) + wit(θit, θ−it) ≥ θitx(rit, θ−it) + wit(rit, θ−it) (2)
for all reports ri ∈ Θi.
See, e.g., Athey and Miller (2007), Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2010). The defini-
tion in particular states that if a mechanism is incentive compatible, then every stage
mechanism for all histories is incentive compatible. The following lemma can be proved
using the Envelope Theorem (which is a standard exercise in mechanism design).
Lemma 1. A mechanism is IC if and only if for each agent i the following two condi-
tions hold:
1. Monotonicity of x: x(θi, θ−i) ≤ x(θ′i, θ−i) for θi ≤ θ′i.
2. Payoff equivalence: Fix θˆi ∈ Θi. Then for all θ
θix(θi, θ−i) + wi(θi, θ−i) = θˆix(θˆi, θ−i) + wi(θˆi, θ−i) +
∫ θi
θˆi
x(β, θ−i)dβ. (3)
Since the term θˆix(θˆi, θ−i) +wi(θˆi, θ−i) is independent of θi, we will write hi(θ−i) for
it. Note, however, that hi(θ−i) does depend on the particular choice of θˆi.
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Objective
For a given stage mechanism we can write down the expected welfare going forward
from period t as
Uht(χ) = Uht(x,w) := EΘt
[
(θ1 + θ2)xt(θ) + w1t(θ) + w2t(θ)
]
.
This is the period-t expected discounted welfare that the agents receive after history ht.
The aim of this chapter is to identify welfare-optimal mechanisms, that is, mechanisms
χ that solve
max
χ
U(χ) := Uh0(χ), s. t. χ is IC.
Lemma 2 in the appendix provides a useful way to rewrite the objective function in
terms of the allocation rule x and hi(θ−i).
3. Results
The aim of this section is to identify mechanisms that are optimal in the above stated
sense. The following conditions on F which we need to derive our results are standard
in the mechanism design literature.
Condition 1 (Monotone Hazard Rates). The hazard rate f(θi)
1−F (θi) is non-decreasing in
θi and the reversed hazard rate
f(θi)
F (θi)
is non-increasing in θi.
A voting rule x is a rule where x(θ) only depends on {sgn(θi)}i=1,2. A voting
mechanism is a mechanism where the allocation rule after all histories is a voting rule.
In each of the two subsections below we will present a setting in which the welfare-
maximizing dynamic decision rule is a voting mechanism.
The proofs in each part will proceed as follows: First, we show that under the
appropriate assumptions stage mechanisms consisting of a voting rule and promising
the same continuation payoffs for all type profiles are weakly welfare-superior to all
other stage mechanisms. Then we make use of the following proposition to deduce that
also the best dynamic mechanism uses a voting rule in every period. For this step
to work it is helpful that optimal stage mechanisms are of as simple a form as voting
mechanisms.
Proposition 1. Assume that for every history ht and admissible stage mechanism
(xt, wt) in period t, there exists an admissible stage mechanism (xˆt, wˆt), where xˆt is a
voting rule and wˆt is constant, and such that
Uht(xt, wt) ≤ Uht(xˆt, wˆt).
Then a voting mechanism is among the optimal mechanisms.
Proof. We start with any dynamic mechanism χ and transform it into a mechanism
that uses a voting rule in every period and such that U weakly increases. Start with
t = 0. The assumption states that there exists a voting stage mechanism (xˆ0, wˆ0) with
constant wˆ0 and such that U(xˆ0, wˆ0) ≥ U(x0, w0). Since the voting stage mechanism is
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admissible and promises constant continuations, these continuations can be generated
by a mechanism that is independent of h1. Denote by χ′ this new dynamic mecha-
nism. Since x′1 and w
′
1 are independent of h
1, we know (again by the assumption)
that there exists a voting stage mechanism (xˆ1, wˆ1) with constant wˆ1 and such that
Uh1(xˆ1, wˆ1) ≥ Uh1(x′1, w′1) for all h1. Again, wˆ1 can be generated by a mechanism that
does not condition on histories h2. Now if we let χ′′ be the mechanism that arises
if one exchanges the stage mechanism (x′1, w
′
1) in χ
′ for (xˆ1, wˆ1), we know that χ′′ is
still incentive compatible: All promised continuations in period 0 change by the same
amount, independent of the history h1 and in particular independent of θ0. Repeating
this argument inductively for t ≥ 2 completes the proof.
Unanimity
Unanimity requires the mechanism to always adhere to a decision to which both agents
agree. For example, if both types in some period are positive the mechanism has to
choose xt = 1 for sure. Formally, the condition is defined as follows:
Definition 3. A mechanism is called unanimous if, for every period and all possible
histories, x(θ) = 1 if θ > 0 and x(θ) = 0 if θ < 0.
Note that mechanisms not satisfying this requirement will probably have legiti-
macy problems: Although all parties involved in the decision process opt in favor of
the proposal, the mechanism forces its rejection. Furthermore, if agents are not able
to collectively commit to the decision prescribed by the mechanism, then mechanisms
satisfying unanimity are the only feasible mechanisms. Also note that mechanisms
proposed in the literature are not excluded by this assumption (see, e. g., Jackson and
Sonnenschein 2007, Casella 2005). In the next subsection we will see that even when re-
laxing this restriction, for certain distribution functions only non-deterministic decision
rules can yield a higher expected welfare than voting rules.
Theorem 1. Suppose that F satisfies Condition 1. Then a voting mechanism is optimal
among all unanimous mechanisms.
Proof. The proof consists of establishing the preconditions of Proposition 1. So let
(x,w) be a stage mechanism after some history ht (since we are only concerned with
unanimous mechanisms, x satisfies unanimity). Set (θˆ1, θˆ2) = (0, 0) and let hi be the
resulting redistribution functions implied by Lemma 1. Let θ∗ ∈ arg maxθ∈Θi h1(θ) +
h2(θ). We first show that setting h1(θ2) = h1(θ
∗) for all θ2 and h2(θ1) = h2(θ∗) for all
θ1 does not decrease Uht(x,w).
Since so far we have not changed x, by Lemma 2 it is enough to show that the terms
involving the redistribution functions do not decrease in this step. But this follows from∫
Θ1
h2(θ1)dF (θ1) +
∫
Θ2
h1(θ2)dF (θ2) =
∫ θ
θ
[
h2(β) + h1(β)
]
dF (β)
≤
∫ θ
θ
[
h2(θ
∗) + h1(θ∗)
]
dF (θ∗).
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Next we show that changing x to a voting rule does not decrease welfare. It is enough
to consider the regions where θ1 ≤ 0, θ2 ≥ 0 and θ1 ≥ 0, θ2 ≤ 0 because the mechanism
is unanimous. By Lemma 3 and the choice of (θˆ1, θˆ2), we know that the first term in
(4), which for the region θ1 ≤ 0, θ2 ≥ 0 amounts to∫ 0
θ
∫ θ
0
[−F (θ1)
f(θ1)
+
1− F (θ2)
f(θ2)
]
x(θ1, θ2)dF (θ2)dF (θ1),
is maximized by setting x to 1, as soon as Condition 1 holds. Since the same is true for
the region where θ1 ≥ 0, θ2 ≤ 0, we have constructed a voting stage mechanism that is
weakly welfare superior to the old stage mechanism.
Let (x′, w′) denote the new stage mechanism. The proof is complete if we can
show that w′ is constant and can be generated. Constancy of w′ holds for any stage
mechanism where x′ is a voting rule and the functions h′i are constant. More specifically,
w′i is equal to hi(θ
∗). Since the old mechanism was unanimous, wi(θ∗, θ∗) = hi(θ∗).
Because wi(θ
∗, θ∗) could be generated, it follows that w′ can be generated.
Neutrality of Alternatives
In this section, we show that in some situations we can derive optimality of voting
mechanisms even if unanimity does not hold. This shows that the restriction imposed
in the previous section does in many cases not reduce welfare.
We assume that the distribution of types is neutral across alternatives, i.e., it is
symmetric around 0. This is an important special case of our general model and has been
analyzed, among others, by Carrasco and Fuchs (2011). For instance, this assumption
is satisfied if a committee has to decide among two proposals that are valued equally
ex ante. Specifying one alternative as the default, the distribution of valuations for
changing from the default to the alternative proposal is symmetric around 0.
Theorem 2. Suppose F satisfies Condition 1 and is neutral across alternatives. Then
a voting mechanism is optimal among all deterministic mechanisms.
The proof of Theorem 2 is presented in the appendix. Similar arguments as in
the last subsection can be given for restricting attention to deterministic mechanisms:
First, stochastic mechanisms are difficult to implement and face legitimacy problems in
practice. It is barely conceivable that a parliament would introduce decision protocols
that involve random elements. Second, all proposed mechanisms in the literature and
mechanisms observed in practice are usually deterministic and therefore not excluded
from our analysis. Numerical simulation also suggests that expected welfare can be
improved only slightly using stochastic mechanisms. The following corollary combines
Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 and summarizes all properties one has to give up in order
to improve upon voting rules.
Corollary 1. Assume F satisfies Condition 1 and is neutral across alternatives. Then
every decision rule that is strictly welfare-superior to any voting rule is stochastic and
does not satisfy unanimity.
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4. Discussion
We have seen that despite the absence of money as a means for implementing rules
other than majority voting, the possibility to condition decision rules on the past gives
us the possibility to design dynamic decision rules that take preference intensities into
account. However, we have shown that for committees consisting of two players the
welfare maximizing dynamic decision rule nonetheless consists of simple majority voting
in every period. This holds unless desirable properties of the decision rule are given
up. We therefore provide a possible explanation for why majority voting is used almost
universally in practice.
One extension of our model is to allow for correlation of agent types over time. How-
ever, this restricts the class of incentive compatible mechanisms since the quasi-linear
separation of continuation payoffs from the payoff in the current period disappears.
While voting rules would still be optimal in this restricted class, our model without
correlation shows that voting rules are also optimal in the larger class.
A major open problem is the question as to what extent our results generalize to
more than two agents. We believe that a substantial difficulty towards progress in this
direction is to understand in how far continuation values can be redistributed among
the agents.
Appendix
Helpful Lemmata
The following shows how the welfare of every incentive compatible mechanism can be
expressed in terms of the allocation function and the functions hi defined following
Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. Let χ be an incentive compatible mechanism and define
ψ(θi) =
{ −F (θi)
f(θi)
if θi ≤ θˆi,
1−F (θi)
f(θi)
otherwise.
Then for every history ht we have
Uht(χ) =
∫
Θ
[
ψ(θ1) + ψ(θ2)
]
x(θ)dF (θ) +
∫
Θ1
h2(θ1)dF (θ1) +
∫
Θ2
h1(θ2)dF (θ2). (4)
Proof. First note that
Uht(χ) =
∫ θ
θ
∫ θ
θ
[
θ1x(θ) + θ2x(θ) + w1(θ) + w2(θ)
]
dF (θ2)dF (θ1), (5)
and by Lemma 1
wi(θ) =
∫ θi
θˆi
x(β, θ−i)dβ − θix(θ) + hi(θ−i). (6)
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Using integration by parts, we first rewrite the term∫ θ
θ
[∫ θi
θˆi
x(β, θ−i)dβ
]
f(θi)dθi
=
∫ θ
θˆi
x(β, θ−i)dβ F (θ)︸︷︷︸
=1
−
∫ θ
θˆi
x(β, θ−i)dβ F (θ)︸︷︷︸
=0
− ∫ θ
θ
x(θi, θ−i)F (θi)dθi
=
∫ θ
θˆi
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
x(θ)dF (θi) +
∫ θˆi
θ
−F (θi)
f(θi)
x(θ)dF (θi). (7)
Now plug (6) into (5) and use (7) to complete the proof.
The next lemma implies, together with Condition 1, that the first part of (4) is
maximized by a constant allocation function whenever only one part of the function ψ
is considered.
Lemma 3. Suppose that ψ(θ1, θ2) is non-increasing in θ1 and θ2, and that
∫
ψ(θ)dF (θ) <
∞. Then the problem
max
x
∫ b
a
∫ d
c
ψ(θ1, θ2) · x(θ1, θ2)dF (θ2)dF (θ1)
s. t. x is non-decreasing in θ
0 ≤ x(θ) ≤ 1
is solved optimally either by setting x∗(θ) = 1 or x∗(θ) = 0.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that there exists a function xˆ(θ) that achieves a strictly
higher value. Define x′(θ1, θ2) := 1F (d)−F (c)
∫ d
c
xˆ(θ1, β)dF (β). This function is feasible
for the above problem given that xˆ is feasible and, by Chebyshev’s inequality, for all θ1,∫ d
c
ψ(θ1, θ2)xˆ(θ1, θ2)dF (θ2)
≤
∫ d
c
ψ(θ1, θ2)dF (θ2)
1
F (d)− F (c)
∫ d
c
xˆ(θ1, θ2)dF (θ2)
=
∫ d
c
ψ(θ1, θ2)x
′(θ1, θ2)dF (θ2).
Since this inequality holds for every θ1, we also have∫ b
a
∫ d
c
ψ(θ1, θ2)xˆ(θ1, θ2)dF (θ2)dF (θ1) ≤
∫ b
a
∫ d
c
ψ(θ1, θ2)x
′(θ1, θ2)dF (θ2)dF (θ1).
Defining x′′(θ1, θ2) = 1F (b)−F (a)
∫ b
a
x′(θ1, θ2)dF (θ1) and again applying Chebyshev’s in-
equality as above, we get that∫ b
a
∫ d
c
ψ(θ1, θ2)x
′(θ1, θ2)dF (θ2)dF (θ1) ≤
∫ b
a
∫ d
c
ψ(θ1, θ2)x
′′(θ1, θ2)dF (θ2)dF (θ1).
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Since the objective function is linear in x, the constant function x′′ is weakly dominated
by either x ≡ 1 or x ≡ 0, contradicting the initial claim.
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. We establish the preconditions of Proposition 1. Fix an arbitrary history ht and
consider the stage mechanism (x,w) employed after this history. Let w := maxθ{w1(θ)+
w2(θ)} and let θw be an optimizer. We normalize w such that w1(θw) = w2(θw) = 0 by
decreasing wi by wi(θw) for all i. This does not affect incentive compatibility. After the
normalization we have
w1(θ) + w2(θ) ≤ 0.
We start with some preliminaries where we derive a set of inequalities that are satisfied
by every incentive compatible stage mechanism for which the above inequality holds.
Preliminaries:
Set (θˆ1, θˆ2) := (θ, θ), let hi denote the resulting redistribution functions implied by
Lemma 1 and define gi(θ) := θix(θ) −
∫ θi
θˆi
x(β, θ−i)dβ. It follows from Lemma 1 that
wi(θ) = −gi(θ) + hi(θ−i). Let h∗ := maxθ{h1(θ) + h2(−θ)} − θ and θ∗ be a maximizer.
Normalize h such that h1(θ
∗) = h∗ + θ and h2(−θ∗) = 0 by increasing h1(x2) and
decreasing h2(x1) by h2(−θ∗). The definition of h∗ implies
h1(θ) + h2(−θ) ≤ h∗ + θ for all θ, (8)
and w1(θ,−θ) + w2(θ,−θ) ≤ 0 implies
h1(θ) + h2(−θ) ≤ g1(−θ, θ) + g2(−θ, θ)
= −
∫ −θ
θ
x(β, θ)dβ −
∫ θ
θ
x(−θ, β)dβ
≤
∫ θ
−θ
x(β, θ)dβ ≤ θ + θ. (9)
By plugging θ∗ into (9) and using the definition of h∗, it follows that h∗ ≤ θ∗.
Define a := inf{θ1 | x(θ1, h∗) = 1}. If there does not exist θ1 such that x(θ1, h∗) = 1,
set a := θ. Without loss we can assume that a ≥ −h∗, since otherwise we can “mirror”
the mechanism on the dotted line shown in Figure 1.1 Let θ1 ≥ a. Then expanding and
rearranging w1(θ1, θ
∗) + w2(θ1, θ∗) ≤ 0 yields
h2(θ1) ≤ −(h∗ + θ) + g1(θ1, θ∗) + g2(θ1, θ∗)
= −h∗ − θ + θ1 −
∫ θ1
θ
x(β, θ∗)dβ + θ∗ −
∫ θ∗
θ
x(θ1, β)dβ
1Let (x#, w#) be the mirrored mechanism, then x#(θ1, θ2) = 1 − x(−θ2,−θ1), w#i (θ1, θ2) =
w−i(−θ2,−θ1). The new mechanism is IC iff. the old mechanism is IC and by our symmetry as-
sumptions the mirrored mechanism yields the same welfare. Also, h∗ and θ∗ will not be changed by
this operation.
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θ1
θ2
(θ, θ)
h∗
θ∗
a−θ∗
Figure 1: Proof of Theorem 2. The shaded area indicates the profiles θ where
x(θ) = 1.
= −h∗ + θ∗ − θ∗ + h∗ −
∫ h∗
θ
x(θ1, β)dβ
= −
∫ h∗
θ
x(θ1, β)dβ, (10)
where in the second equality we made use of the fact that x(β, θ∗) = 1 for β ≥ a and
x(θ1, β) = 1 for θ1 ≥ a, h∗ ≤ β ≤ θ∗ (see Figure 1). Similar arguments will be used
more often in the equalities below.
Define b := inf{θ2 | x(−h∗, θ2) = 1} (if there is no θ2 such that x(−h∗, θ2) = 1, set
b := θ) and let θ2 ≤ b. Then w1(−θ∗, θ2) + w2(−θ∗, θ2) ≤ 0 implies
h1(θ2) ≤ g1(θ∗, θ2) + g2(θ∗, θ2)
= 0−
∫ −θ∗
θ
x(β, θ2)dβ −
∫ θ2
θ
x(−θ∗, β)dβ
=
∫ θ
−θ∗
x(β, θ2)dβ. (11)
Since by Lemma 1 an incentive compatible stage mechanism is completely deter-
mined by x and h, we will in the following change x and h in a number of consecutive
steps while making sure that x stays monotone and we never decrease the welfare
Uht(x, h) := Uht(x,w). At the end of the proof we will make sure that the resulting
mechanism is admissible. First, we increase h2(θ1) for θ1 ≥ a and h1(θ2) for θ2 ≤ b until
(10) and (11) hold with equality since this trivially weakly increases welfare.
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Step 1:
In this step we will change the variables x(θ) with θ ∈ A := {(θ1, θ2) | θ1 ≥ a, θ2 ≤ h∗},
h2(θ1) with θ1 ≥ a and h1(θ2) with θ2 ≤ h∗. If we change h1 and h2 such that (11) and
(10) continue to hold with equality, we can express changes of all the variables in terms
of changes of x. Making use of the fact that for θ2 ≤ h∗, (11) is equivalent to
h1(θ2) =
∫ θ
a
x(β, θ2)dβ,
and by substituting (11) and (10), we can rewrite the the part of Uht that depends on
changes of the variables x(θ) for θ ∈ A as∫ θ
a
∫ h∗
θ
[−F (θ1)
f(θ1)
+
1− F (θ2)
f(θ2)
]
x(θ1, θ2)dF (θ2)dF (θ1)
+
∫ h∗
θ
∫ θ
a
x(β, θ2)dβ dF (θ2)−
∫ θ
a
∫ h∗
θ
x(θ1, β)dβ dF (θ1)
=
∫ θ
a
∫ h∗
θ
[
1− F (θ1)
f(θ1)
+
−F (θ2)
f(θ2)
]
x(θ1, θ2)dF (θ2)dF (θ1).
Lemma 3 implies that this term is maximized by setting x(θ) = 0 or 1 for θ ∈ A. To
see that we cannot gain by setting x(θ) = 1 we bound
Uht(1, h) =
∫ θ
a
∫ h∗
θ
[
1− F (θ1)
f(θ1)
+
−F (θ2)
f(θ2)
]
dF (θ2)dF (θ1)
=
∫ −a
θ
∫ h∗
θ
[
F (θ1)
f(θ1)
+
−F (θ2)
f(θ2)
]
dF (θ2)dF (θ1)
=
∫ −a
θ
∫ h∗
−a
[
F (θ1)
f(θ1)
+
−F (θ2)
f(θ2)
]
dF (θ2)dF (θ1)
≤ 0 = Uht(0, h).
Here, the second equality is due to the symmetry of F around zero, the third equality
is because the integral over [θ,−a]× [θ,−a] vanishes, and the inequality is due to log-
concavity of F and the fact that −a ≤ h∗. Hence, we weakly increase welfare by setting
x ≡ 0 in A and h1 and h2 according to (11) and (10), respectively.
Step 2:
For this step define the set B = {θ1 > −h∗, θ2 > h∗ | x(θ1, θ2) = 0}. Set x(θ) = 1 for
θ ∈ B and h1(θ2) = h∗ + θ for all θ2 for which there is a θ1 such that (θ1, θ2) ∈ B.
We claim that this does not decrease Uht . Since allocative efficiency improved in this
step, we only need to check that the sum of promised continuations increased. First,
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let (θ1, θ2) ∈ B. Then (11) is equivalent to
h1(θ2) =
∫ θ
−h∗
x(β, θ2)dβ.
Continuations before this change are given by
h2(θ1) + h1(θ2) +
∫ θ1
θ
x(β, θ2)dβ = h2(θ1) +
∫ θ
−h∗
x(β, θ2)dβ +
∫ θ1
θ
x(β, θ2)dβ = h2(θ1).
After the change we get
h2(θ1) + h
∗ + θ − θ1 +
∫ θ1
θ
x(β, θ2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
dβ − θ2 +
∫ θ2
h∗
x(θ1, β)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
dβ = h2(θ1).
Fixing (θ1, θ2) ∈ B, the claim can similarly be shown for points of the form (θ′1, θ2) and
(θ1, θ
′
2) where θ
′
2 > θ2.
Step 3:
We claim that setting x(θ) = 1 or x(θ) = 0 for θ ∈ [θ,−h∗]× [h∗, θ] increases Uh∗ . This
follows from the fact that, since, ignoring the part which depends on hi, the objective
function in the area where we change x has the form required by Lemma 3. Symmetry
implies that x(θ) = 0 gives the same welfare as x(θ) = 1.
Step 4:
Note that the original mechanism satisfied
h1(−θ) + h2(θ) ≤ h∗ + θ.
Therefore, welfare is not decreased by setting h2(θ) := 0 and h1(−θ) = h∗ + θ for
θ ≤ −b.
Note that the changed mechanism satisfies w1(θ,−θ) + w2(θ,−θ) ≤ 0: For a ≤ θ
this holds as we assumed (10) and (11) to be binding in Step 1, hence g1(θ,−θ) =
g2(θ,−θ) = h1(−θ) = h2(θ) = 0. For −h∗ ≤ θ ≤ a, this holds as continuations weren’t
changed for these values (changed Pivot payments were offset by changes in the h
functions, as (11) was assumed to hold with equality in Step 1). For −b ≤ θ ≤ −h∗
this holds as constraints were assumed to bind in Step 2. For θ ≤ θ ≤ −b this holds as
h1(−θ) + h2(θ) ≤ h∗ + θ = g1(θ,−θ) + g2(θ,−θ).
The fact that w1(θ,−θ) + w2(θ,−θ) ≤ 0 implies that h1(−θ) + h2(θ) ≤ g1(θ,−θ) +
g2(θ,−θ). We can increase h so that equality holds, thereby again improving the mech-
anism, ending up with the following stage mechanism:
x(θ) =
{
1 if θ2 ≥ h∗
0 else,
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h1(θ2) =
{
0 if θ2 ≤ h∗
h∗ + θ else,
h2(θ1) = 0.
We call this class of mechanisms phantom dictatorship with parameter h∗.
Step 5:
So far we have shown that every stage mechanism can be modified until it is a phantom
dictatorship while weakly improving welfare. To prove that for every stage mechanism
there is a simple voting stage mechanism with weakly higher welfare, we show that sim-
ple voting weakly welfare-dominates every phantom dictatorship: Indeed, the optimal
phantom dictatorship is given by the parameter h∗ = E[θ]. Therefore, symmetry of F
around 0 implies that the optimal phantom dictatorship is characterized by h∗ = 0,
which has the same aggregate welfare as unanimity voting.
The voting stage mechanism we have constructed so far has the continuations profile
w1(θ) = w2(θ) = 0 for all θ. It remains to show that this mechanism is admissible. But
this follows from the fact that (0, 0) was an implementable continuation profile of the
original mechanism (namely, at the type profile θw). We therefore established the
conditions for Proposition 1, which completes the proof of the theorem.
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Chapter 3
Optimal Private Good Allocation: The
Case for a Balanced Budget
In an independent private value auction environment, we are interested in
strategy-proof mechanisms that maximize the agents’ residual surplus, that
is, the utility derived from the physical allocation minus transfers accruing
to an external entity. We find that, under the assumption of an increas-
ing hazard rate of type distributions, an optimal deterministic mechanism
never extracts any net payments from the agents, that is, it will be budget-
balanced. Specifically, optimal mechanisms have a simple “posted price” or
“option”form. In the bilateral trade environment, we obtain optimality of
posted price mechanisms without any assumption on type distributions.
1. Introduction
Most parts of the mechanism design literature studying welfare maximization problems
focus on mechanisms implementing the efficient allocation. However, in general it is
not possible to implement the efficient allocation in dominant strategies using budget-
balanced mechanisms (Green and Laffont 1979). Given this result, we study the ques-
tion of how to choose among different mechanisms that cannot attain both, allocative
efficiency and budget-balancedness. Since we are concerned with welfare maximization,
the social planner’s objective function should consist of the agents’ aggregate utility
and therefore include aggregate transfers. In other words, one seeks to find mechanisms
that maximize what we call residual surplus. This is the surplus, or utility, the agents
derive from the chosen physical allocation, reduced by the amount of transfers that are
lost to an external agency (this is often called “money burning”).
A common approach is to implement the efficient allocation via Groves mechanisms
and to redistribute as much money to the agents as possible without distorting incentives
(Cavallo 2006, Guo and Conitzer 2009, Guo and Conitzer 2010, Moulin 2009). This
approach aims at characterizing the optimal mechanism for allocating private goods
that implements the efficient allocation in dominant strategies, is individually rational
and never creates a budget deficit (ex-post). However, if mechanisms that allocate
inefficiently yield higher residual surplus (Guo and Conitzer 2008) it is not clear why
one should use a mechanism that allocates efficiently.
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Consequently, we drop the requirement that mechanisms allocate efficiently. Instead,
we take an optimal mechanism design approach and consider mechanisms that are
comparable to the ones considered before in that they are strategy-proof, deterministic,
never run at a deficit and satisfy ex-post participation constraints. We analyze which
mechanism maximizes residual surplus when an indivisible good is auctioned among
two agents with independent private values that are distributed according to prior
type distributions. We show that under an increasing hazard rate assumption on type
distributions, the optimal mechanism will never waste any payments, thereby deviating
distinctly from the efficient allocation (Theorem 1). In fact, our proof method reveals
that all mechanisms that allocate efficiently are worse than the simple mechanism where
the object is always given to one of the agents (Corollary 1), showing that our general
mechanism design approach has clear advantages over the previous approach to search
for the optimal Groves mechanism. We show that the optimal mechanism is either a
“posted price” or an “option” mechanism: The object is assigned to one of the agents
unless both agents agree to trade at a prespecified price (posted price mechanism) or
unless the second agent uses his option to buy the object at a fixed price from the first
agent (option mechanism). Therefore, the optimal mechanisms do not invoke money
burning and are of a particularly simple form. In the bilateral trade setting, we establish
optimality of posted price mechanisms without any restrictions on type distributions
(Theorem 2). This provides an argument for the focus on budget-balanced mechanisms
(see Myerson and Satterthwaite 1983, Hagerty and Rogerson 1987).
The requirement that a mechanism does not produce a budget deficit ex-post is
considerably stronger than the requirement that this holds in expectation. However, in
many situations it is reasonable that a budget breaker is infeasible and therefore ex-post
constraints need to be obeyed. This includes situations where there is no insurance or
where agents have restricted access to capital markets. Also, hidden information issues
towards a third party cannot always be resolved, and autarkic mechanisms that can be
implemented without explicit intervention by a third party might be preferable (e.g.,
when mechanisms are used to model bargaining situations). If all these considerations
do not apply and mechanisms that create no deficit in expectation can be implemented,
then one can achieve the first-best solution (see Section 5). Similarly, we show that one
can potentially achieve the first-best if mechanisms are only required to be Bayesian
incentive compatible. In contrast to these two constraints, which are the main driving
forces behind our results, we argue that the participation constraint and the restriction
to deterministic mechanisms are not essential to the spirit of our results.
Our work is part of a small literature that searches for mechanisms maximizing
residual surplus when the first-best is not achievable. Miller (2012) studies a model of
firms colluding in a Bertrand oligopoly. A mechanism used by a cartel to allocate market
shares should maximize residual surplus. Miller shows that under general conditions
it is never optimal to allocate market shares efficiently and gives numerical evidence
that for some type distributions it is optimal to give up efficiency in order to obtain
a balanced budget. However, other examples indicate that this observation does not
hold for all distributions. Athey and Miller (2007) study residual surplus maximization
in a repeated bilateral trade setting and obtain numerical results suggesting that for
many type distributions the optimal mechanism is a posted price mechanism. Closely
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related to this chapter is independent work by Shao and Zhou (2012), who obtain the
characterization of our Theorem 1 when restricting to symmetric distributions of types
and allowing mechanisms to violate individual rationality.
Another related strand of the literature studies the expected residual surplus of
Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms when it is not possible to redistribute any
payments among the agents (Hartline and Roughgarden 2008, Chakravarty and Kaplan
2013, Condorelli 2012). This implies that methods similar to those in Myerson (1981)
can be applied. It is shown that for a large class of type distributions (those which
exhibit an increasing hazard rate) it is optimal to always assign the object to the same
agent. Maximization of residual surplus also plays a role in the analysis of optimal
mechanisms used by bidding rings (McAfee and McMillan 1992). It is worth noting that
the equivalence between Bayes-Nash and dominant strategy implementation (Gershkov,
Goeree, Kushnir, Moldovanu and Shi 2013, Manelli and Vincent 2010) does not apply
to our model.1
We present the basic model for the auction environment in Section 2 and characterize
incentive compatible mechanisms in Section 3. The optimization problem is solved in
Section 4, the role of the assumptions is discussed in Section 5. We study this mechanism
design problem in the bilateral trade context in Section 6, and conclude in Section 7.
2. Model
An indivisible object is auctioned among two agents. Each agent i = 1, 2 has a
valuation xi for the object, which is his private information. Valuations are drawn in-
dependently from Xi = [0, x¯i] according to distribution functions Fi with corresponding
densities fi, which we assume to be bounded. We denote by X = X1×X2 the product
type space and by F the joint distribution on X. For notational convenience, when
concentrating on agent i, we will write (xi, x−i) for x = (x1, x2) ∈ X.
If agent i is given a payment of pi (usually negative), his utility is xi+pi for winning
the object, and pi if the other agent gets the object.
Mechanisms
Due to the Revelation Principle we focus on truthfully implementable direct revelation
mechanisms for selling the object.
Definition 1. A mechanism M is a tuple (d, p), where d : X → {0, 1}2 and p : X → R2
are measurable functions, such that d1(x) + d2(x) = 1.
2
1See Section 5 for more details.
2For a discussion of stochastic mechanisms, see Section 5. We follow Athey and Miller (2007) and
Miller (2012) and assume that the good is always allocated. This is reasonable, for example, when
considering how a cartel allocates market shares, or how the government sells licenses to firms. While
there can be welfare gains from not allocating the good when one focuses on anonymous mechanisms
(de Clippel, Naroditskiy, Polukarov, Greenwald and Jennings 2013), these gains seem to be minor in
our model. Moreover, the assumption that the good is always allocated is without loss of generality in
the trade setting (Section 6).
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The interpretation is that di(x) = 1 if and only if agent i gets the object. If the
agents report x, then agent i receives as payment the component pi(x) of p(x).
Equilibrium Concept
We consider strategy-proof mechanisms where truthful reporting is a dominant strategy
for both agents. Therefore, we define the following notion of incentive compatibility:
Definition 2. A mechanism M is incentive compatible (IC) if for every agent i and
for each xi ∈ Xi, ri ∈ Xi,
di(xi, r−i) · xi + pi(xi, r−i) ≥ di(ri, r−i) · xi + pi(ri, r−i)
holds for each r−i ∈ X−i.
This definition is independent of the distribution of valuations, which reflects the ro-
bustness of strategy-proof mechanisms as compared to mechanisms that are Bayes-Nash
incentive compatible. Although the set of mechanisms we consider does therefore not
depend on F , the next section shows that the distributions determine which mechanism
is optimal.
Objective and Further Constraints
We aim at finding the mechanism that maximizes the sum of agents’ ex-ante (expected)
residual surplus, that is, utility derived from the physical allocation minus aggregate
payments. We impose the constraint that the mechanism has to be ex-post no-deficit
(ND), that is, for every type profile x, we require p1(x) + p2(x) ≤ 0.3 Also, the mech-
anism has to be ex-post individually rational (IR), that is, for all type profiles x, we
require di(x)xi + pi(x) ≥ 0, i = 1, 2. Summarizing, we want to solve the following
optimization problem:
max
M=(d,p)
∫
X
[
d1(x)x1 + d2(x)x2 + p1(x) + p2(x)
]
dF (x) (1)
s. t. M satisfies IC, ND and IR.
We say that a mechanism is optimal if it solves problem (1).
3. Characterization of Incentive Compatibility
The aim of this section is to give a characterization of incentive compatibility in order to
simplify problem (1). The conditions characterizing incentive compatible mechanisms
involve a monotonicity and an integrability condition. We first define monotonicity.
3Ex-post budget constraints are commonly imposed on mechanism design problems: see, for exam-
ple, the literature on optimal redistribution (Guo and Conitzer 2010, Guo and Conitzer 2009, Moulin
2009) and bilateral trade (Hagerty and Rogerson 1987, Myerson and Satterthwaite 1983), or Chawla,
Hartline, Rajan and Ravi (2006). The role of this assumption is discussed in Section 5.
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Definition 3. The allocation function d is monotone if di is non-decreasing in xi for
i = 1, 2.
Now given a monotone allocation function d, define the following functions for i =
1, 2:
gi(x−i) := inf{xi : di(xi, x−i) = 1}.
If there is no xi such that d(xi, x−i) = 1, then we set gi(x−i) = x¯i. Note that if d is
monotone, these functions define d almost everywhere. The following lemma, which is
a corollary of Myerson (1981), gives a characterization of incentive compatibility.
Lemma 1. A mechanism M = (d, p) is incentive compatible, if and only if the following
two conditions are satisfied:
1. The allocation rule d is monotone.
2. For i = 1, 2 let x−i ∈ X−i be given. Then for all xi ≤ x′i ∈ Xi,
pi(xi, x−i)− pi(x′i, x−i) =
{
gi(x−i) if di(xi, x−i) = 0 and di(x′i, x−i) = 1
0 otherwise.
(2)
The interpretation of condition (2) is that an agent who receives the object is pun-
ished by paying a higher amount compared to the case where he would not have gotten
the object. The punishment has to make the agent’s marginal type gi(x−i) indifferent
between receiving and not receiving the object.
It follows from Lemma 1 that if a mechanism satisfies IC, payments have the fol-
lowing form:
pi(xi, x−i) = qi(x−i)− gi(x−i)di(xi, x−i)
with some functions qi : X−i → R. This can be interpreted as a payoff-equivalence
result: Payments are completely determined by the allocation as soon as one fixes the
payment for some type xi. Or, in other words, once the allocation is fixed, the only
freedom that is left regarding the payment scheme, is to give the agent an additional
payment that is independent of his type. These additional payments can serve as a
possibility to redistribute certain amounts of payments to another agent, as e.g., in
Cavallo (2006). Given an allocation rule d and a payment rule p, we say that the
redistribution payment q implicitly defined by the above equality is associated with p.
The simplified formulation of problem (1) is the following:
max
M=(d,p)
∫
X
[
d1(x)[x1 − g1(x2)] + d2(x)[x2 − g2(x1)] + q1(x2) + q2(x1)
]
dF (x) (3)
s. t. M satisfies IR and ND, q is associated with p and d is monotone.
We will write U(M) for the above integral and from now on only consider mechanisms
that are IC, IR and ND.
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4. The Optimal Auction
In this section, we present the first main result of this chapter: if we impose an increasing
hazard rate condition on the type distributions, then the optimal mechanism is always
budget-balanced. Specifically, it turns out that the optimal mechanism takes one of
two simple forms:
Either it is a posted price mechanism which by default allocates the object to one
of the agents (agent 1, say) and changes the allocation if and only if both agents agree
to trade at a prespecified price a, i.e., agent 1 reports a valuation below a fixed price a
and agent 2 reports a valuation above a. If agent 2 is allocated the object, he makes a
payment a to agent 1, otherwise no transfers accrue.
Or it is an option mechanism where the good is allocated by default to agent 1, but
agent 2 has the option to buy the object at price a. Hence, if agent 2’s valuation is
above the strike price a, he buys the object and pays a to agent 1 (see also Shao and
Zhou 2012).
Formally, these two mechanisms are defined as follows:
Definition 4. A mechanism M = (d, p) is a posted price mechanism with default
agent 1 and price a, if
d2(x) = 1, p(x) = (a,−a) if x1 ≤ a and x2 ≥ a,
d2(x) = 0, p(x) = (0, 0) otherwise.
M is an option mechanism with default agent 1 and price a, if
d2(x) = 1, p(x) = (a,−a) if x2 ≥ a,
d2(x) = 0, p(x) = (0, 0) otherwise.
Similarly, one can define posted price and option mechanisms with default agent 2.
If we do not specify the agent or price we just say that M is option or posted price.
Both classes of mechanisms are parameterized by the price a and it is easy to check
that all these mechanisms are budget-balanced as well as incentive compatible and
individually rational.
Our assumption on type distributions is the following:
Condition 1 (HR). The hazard rates of the type distributions are monotone. That is,
the functions hi(xi) =
fi(xi)
1−Fi(xi) are non-decreasing in xi ∈ [0, x¯i) for i = 1, 2.
Theorem 1. Given condition (HR), the optimal mechanism is either a posted price or
an option mechanism.
The proof can be sketched as follows: We first show the important auxiliary result
that either an option mechanism or a posted price mechanism is optimal inM0, the class
of mechanisms such that gi is monotone and piecewise constant for each agent (that is,
the line that separates the two allocation regions is a step function) (Lemma 2). We then
argue that the welfare of a given mechanism can be approximated arbitrarily well by a
mechanism inM0 (Lemma 3). The Theorem then follows by the following observation:
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Suppose there is a mechanism M¯ being strictly better than the best option or posted
price mechanism, and denote the welfare difference by ε. It follows from Lemma 3 that
there is a mechanism in the class M0 whose welfare is within ε2 of U(M¯), thus being
better than the best option or posted price mechanism. But this contradicts Lemma 2,
hence there cannot be a mechanism being better than the best option or posted price
mechanism.
While the approximation part of the proof can be found in the appendix, we state
and prove Lemma 2, which contains the essence of why Theorem 1 holds.
Lemma 2. Assume condition (HR) and let M = (d, p) be any mechanism inM0. Then
there exists a mechanism M ′ that is posted price or option such that U(M ′) ≥ U(M).
Proof. The proof consists of three steps, where we constructively manipulate M in order
to end up with the desired mechanism M ′. We denote the jump points of g2(x1) and
g1(x2) by αj and βj, respectively (see Figure 1).
Step 1: This step shows how to determine the maximal possible redistribution
payments qi. To this end, we note that, without loss of generality, we can assume that
for the first segment of g1 we have g1(x2) = 0 since otherwise we could switch the roles
of the agents.
We now claim that q2(x1) = 0, ∀x1 ∈ X1; that is, no money is redistributed to
agent 2. To see this, pick arbitrary x1 and observe that g1(0) = 0 and d2(x1, 0) = 0;
therefore g1(0)d1(x1, 0) = g2(x1)d2(x1, 0) = 0. From (ND) it follows that q1(0)+q2(x1) =
p1(x1, 0) + p2(x1, 0) ≤ 0. Also, (IR) for agent 2 at (x1, 0) implies q2(x1) ≥ 0, and (IR)
for agent 1 at (0, 0) implies q1(0) ≥ 0, and therefore q2(x1) = 0.
Next, we can assume that
q1(x2) = min
x1
{
g1(x2)d1(x1, x2) + g2(x1)d2(x1, x2)
}
(4)
always holds, since by (ND) this relation always holds with ≤ and changing it to equal-
ity does not reduce U(M). In this way, the complete payment-scheme is determined
through the allocation rule d. Note that setting the function q this way implies that
(ND) and (IR) are always satisfied.
Step 2: In this step we argue that changing the allocation to the one shown in
Figure 1b does not increase money burning, but increases allocative efficiency and
hence aggregate welfare.
Define the set B = {x | x1 ≤ β1 ≤ x2, d2(x) = 0} and consider the sets B1, B2
and C as shown in Figure 1a. We change the allocation rule and allocate the object to
agent 2 for types in B. Since x2 ≥ x1 for x ∈ B, this improves the physical allocation
and we can concentrate on payments. Note that q1, as defined in (4), increases to the
same extent as g1, hence any additional payments in the set B2 can be redistributed.
Also, transfers are weakly increased for types in B1 and C. As the change in allocation
has no effect outside these sets, the claim follows.
Step 3: This step studies the effects of shifting steps in the set R, shown as the
shaded area in Figure 1b, while fixing redistribution payments. Our condition on the
hazard rate ensures that each step should optimally be moved to either the lowest or
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(a) Illustration of the sets used in
Step 2 of the proof.
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(b) Situation after the object is
assigned to agent 2 in the set B.
The dashed lines indicate the
interval in which the jump point
in Step 3 is varied.
Figure 1: Illustration of the proof of Lemma 2.
the highest possible position. Hence, proceeding iteratively, we obtain either an option
mechanism or a posted price mechanism. This will complete the proof.
Changing the allocation in R does not change q1 as defined in (4) and we ignore the
functions qi from now on.
The following is a procedure to remove one step contained in R without decreasing
U(M). We do this exemplarily with the jump point at β3 (see Figure 1b). We vary β3
on the interval [β2, β4] and show that welfare is quasi-convex in β3. This implies that
setting β∗3 = β2 or β4 increases U(M). The part of U(M) that depends on β3 is the
following:∫ α3
α2
[∫ β3
β2
(x1 − α2)dF2(x2) +
∫ x¯2
β3
(x2 − β3)dF2(x2)
]
dF1(x1)
−
∫ x¯1
α3
[∫ β3
β2
α2dF1(x1) +
∫ β4
β3
α3dF2(x2)
]
dF1(x1)
Differentiating with respect to β3 using Leibniz’ rule yields∫ α3
α2
[
f2(β3)(x1 − α2)−
[
1− F2(β3)
]]
dF1(x1) +
∫ x¯1
α3
f2(β3)[α3 − α2]dF1(x1).
Writing constants C1, C2 and C3 for the terms that do not depend on β3, we get
C1f2(β3)− C2
[
1− F2(β3)
]
+ C3f2(β3).
Assuming C2[1−F2(β3)] > 0 (if either C2 = 0 or 1−F2(β3) = 0, we set β∗3 = β4 without
reducing U), we can divide by C2[1−F2(β3)] and get that the derivative is non-negative
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if and only if
C · h2(β3)− 1 ≥ 0,
where C = (C1 + C3)/C2 > 0. Because h2(β3) is non-decreasing by condition (HR),
quasi-convexity follows and U(M) is increased by either setting β∗3 = β2 or β
∗
3 = β4. In
either case, we have decreased the number of steps by one and the procedure ends.
Iteratively applying this procedure establishes the lemma.
A consequence of the theorem is that, given the increasing hazard rates of the agents’
type distributions, finding the best mechanism reduces to finding the best posted price
and option mechanisms and comparing these two. For example, if the agents have the
same distribution function, all option and posted price mechanisms with the same strike
price yield the same welfare and therefore the best mechanism is characterized by the
strike price a∗ satisfying
a∗ = E[x1] = E[x2].
Our intermediate results (see the proof of Lemma 2) also allow for a refined judg-
ment of the welfare implied by the efficient allocation. Miller (2012) showed, under
very general conditions, that the efficient allocation rule is never part of the optimal
mechanism. We can strengthen this statement in our context by providing a mecha-
nism that improves upon all efficient mechanisms. Surprisingly, this improvement can
be achieved using an extremely simple mechanism:
Corollary 1. Given condition (HR), every mechanism that allocates efficiently is dom-
inated by a mechanism that always allocates the good to one of the agents.
More precisely, a mechanism that is better than every efficiently allocating mecha-
nism can be found simply by comparing the agents’ type distributions, giving the good
to the agent with the higher expected valuation and completely ignoring any reported
types.
While optimal mechanisms for distributions obeying condition (HR) are very simple,
the following example shows that if the condition is not satisfied the optimal mechanism
need not be of the form stated in Theorem 1. The example also illustrates the role of
(HR) in establishing the result.
Example 1. Let the distribution function of two symmetric agents be given as
f(xi) =
{
0.9 if xi ≤ 0.5
0.1 otherwise.
Due to the downwards jump at 0.5, f does not satisfy condition (HR). The optimal
posted price mechanism (which is as good as the optimal option mechanism) has a
strike price of a∗ = 0.275, attaining a social welfare of 0.0718. However, the following
mechanism M attains a higher social welfare of 0.0741: Set
d2(x) = 1 ⇔ (x2 ≥ a∗ and x1 ≤ a∗) or (x2 ≥ 0.5 and x1 ≤ 0.5),
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(a) Optimal posted price
mechanism.
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(b) Mechanism M .
Figure 2: Mechanisms presented in Example 1
and set q2(x1) ≡ 0, as well as
q1(x2) =
{
0 if x2 ≤ a∗
a∗ otherwise.
This mechanism and the best option mechanism are depicted in Figure 2. One can
see that the allocation of mechanism M is more efficient. Because the induced higher
payments cannot be redistributed, payments of (0.5 − 0.275) = 0.225 are lost for type
profiles in the shaded area in Figure 2b. But still, since type profiles x with x1, x2 ≥ 0.5
appear so rarely (with density 0.01), this does not counter the positive effect due to the
better allocation. In this sense, an increasing hazard rate ensures that lost payments
can never be weighed out by an improved efficiency of the allocation.
5. Robustness
In this section, we in turn relax the no-deficit, incentive compatibility and participation
constraints as well as the restriction to deterministic mechanisms, and analyze how
sensitive our characterization in Theorem 1 is to these relaxations.
Ex-ante Budget Constraints
While ex-post budget constraints are imposed commonly in the literature and seem
appropriate for many settings, they would effectively be turned into ex-ante constraints
if insurance against budget deficits was available.4 Relaxing the no-deficit constraint
to an ex-ante constraint, thus requiring the mechanism to run at no deficit on average,
simplifies the problem and allows the planner to implement the first-best. This can
be achieved by running the VCG mechanism. This mechanism is ex-post individually
4Note also, that the exact form of the budget constraints can be irrelevant when considering Bayesian
incentive compatible mechanisms (Eso¨ and Futo 1999).
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rational and creates no deficit ex-post. By redistributing the expected surplus in an
arbitrary fixed way to the agents, the mechanism becomes ex-ante budget-balanced and
therefore achieves the first-best.
Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms
If stronger assumptions can be made on the information structure (namely, if the agents’
beliefs equal a common prior that is known to the designer), we can relax the constraints
on the mechanisms to Bayesian incentive compatibility and interim individual rational-
ity. This allows the implementation of mechanisms that achieve higher expected welfare.
Notably, if the distribution of types is symmetric across agents, then the expected ex-
ternality mechanism (d’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet 1979, Arrow 1979) achieves the
first-best.5 To see this, observe that this mechanism allocates efficiently, has a balanced
budget, and has payments given by
ti(θ) =
∫ θ−i
θi
θ−idF−i(θ−i)−
∫ θi
θ−i
θidFi(θi).
Therefore, an agent reporting a type of 0 receives a weakly positive transfer and hence
a weakly positive utility.
This implies that the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy incentive com-
patible mechanisms established by Gershkov, Goeree, Kushnir, Moldovanu and Shi
(2013) does not apply. They show that in a large class of mechanism design problems,
for any Bayesian incentive compatible and interim individually rational mechanism,
there exists an equivalent dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism that is
ex-post individually rational. However, this equivalence is established in the absence of
budget constraints, and the above arguments imply that it cannot be extended to our
setting.
Participation Constraints
While our general characterization of the optimal mechanism does not hold with relaxed
participation constraints, these constraints are not the main driving force behind our
results and the inefficiency of the optimal allocation. Indeed, our characterization can
be obtained without participation constraints if one restricts attention to settings where
agents are symmetric ex-ante (Shao and Zhou 2012).
Stochastic Mechanisms
In the previous section we restricted attention to deterministic mechanisms in order to
be able to analytically characterize the optimal mechanism. Deterministic mechanisms
have additional benefits: They are simpler to implement, and more plausible in some
settings (e.g., when modeling bargaining between agents).
5More generally, a mechanism in the spirit of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) is optimal, that
allocates the object to the agent with the highest weighted virtual valuation.
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Distribution Average loss Maximum loss Instances without loss
Random 0.018 % 0.874 % 92.500 %
IHR 0.003 % 0.420 % 97.850 %
Weibull 0.000 % 0.000 % 100.000 %
All 0.007 % 0.874 % 96.785 %
Table 1: Simulation results comparing the welfare loss due to the restriction to
deterministic mechanisms.
While there are instances where the focus on deterministic mechanisms is not with-
out loss, numerical simulations suggest that the induced loss in welfare is small. We
generated n = 2 000 random instances for three classes of distributions of types: Ran-
dom distributions, random distributions with an increasing hazard rate, and distribu-
tions from the Weibull class with different shape and scale parameters such that the
distribution has an increasing hazard rate. We then computed the optimal determinis-
tic and stochastic mechanism for every instance. The results are summarized in Table 1
which shows, for each distribution class, the average and maximum welfare loss of the
optimal deterministic mechanism, as a percentage of the welfare of the best stochastic
mechanism. The fourth column shows the percentage of instances where there is no loss
due to the restriction to deterministic mechanisms. As can be seen, instances where
the deterministic constraint is binding appear only rarely. Further, even if this is the
case, the percentage loss in expected welfare is very small.
6. Bilateral Trade
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) showed that one cannot implement the efficient allo-
cation in the bilateral trade setting in an ex-post budget-balanced and interim individu-
ally rational way, and characterized the optimal mechanism satisfying these constraints.
In the same environment, Hagerty and Rogerson (1987) study the set of dominant-
strategy implementable mechanisms that are ex-post budget-balanced and individually
rational, showing that essentially only posted price mechanisms fulfill these conditions.
However, a priori it is not clear why one should restrict the search for the optimal mech-
anism to mechanisms with a balanced budget. After all, it is conceivable that deviating
from a balanced budget could improve incentives and therefore lead to higher welfare.
In fact, Schwartz and Wen (2012) show by example that relaxing budget-balancedness
to a no-deficit constraint can improve upon posted price mechanisms. The result in this
section shows that this holds only for stochastic mechanisms; when looking at deter-
ministic mechanisms, the restriction to budget-balanced mechanisms does not reduce
aggregate welfare.
Let the model and notation be as in Section 2, but assume now that agent 1 (called
the “seller” from now on and indexed by S) is the owner of the good before participating
in the mechanism (whereas agent 2 is called the “buyer” and indexed by B). By a buyer
posted price mechanism (B-PP) we denote a posted price mechanism in which the buyer
gets the object if and only if he announces a type high enough, and the seller a type
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Figure 3: Illustration of the proof of Theorem 2. The shaded area indicates the type
profiles where the initial mechanism differs from the posted price mechanism with
strike price gB(0) (dashed line).
that is low enough. Again, we are looking for a mechanism that maximizes the sum of
the expected utilities of the agents, taking monetary transfers into account. The fact
that in the bilateral trade setting the seller initially owns the good requires a stronger
condition for a mechanism to be individually rational: now the outside option for a
seller is to not participate in the mechanism and to keep the object. Hence, for a
mechanism to be individually rational,
dS(x)xS + pS(x) ≥ xS and dB(x)xB + pB(x) ≥ 0 (IR’)
must hold for all x ∈ X.
Thus, a mechanism is optimal if it solves
max
M=(d,p)
∫
X
[
dS(x)xS + dB(x)xB + pS(x) + pB(x)
]
dF (x) (5)
s. t. M satisfies IC, ND and IR’.
Theorem 2. There is a B-PP mechanism that solves problem (5).
Proof. We first show that (IR’) implies that the seller keeps the object whenever his
valuation is higher. Assume to the contrary that trade takes place at xS > xB. Then
(IR’) for the seller implies that the seller receives at least xS and (IR’) for the buyer
implies that he pays at most xB, violating (ND).
Recall that gB(0) denotes the smallest buyer type such that trade takes place when
xS = 0, and gS(xB) denotes the highest seller type such that trade takes place when
xB = xB. We claim that gS(xB) ≤ gB(0). Constraints (IC) and (IR’) for the seller
imply that he receives at least a payment of gS(xB) whenever the buyer reports xB
and trade takes place, in particular at (0, xB). Similarly, (IC) and (IR’) for the buyer
imply that he pays at most gB(0) whenever the seller reports 0, in particular at (0, xB).
Therefore, gS(xB) > gB(0) would violate (ND) at (0, xB).
Finally, we claim that the B-PP mechanism with strike price gB(0) weakly dominates
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the given mechanism. To see this, note that pS(x) + pB(x) ≤ 0 by (ND) and a B-PP
mechanism is budget-balanced. Hence, the posted price mechanism dominates the old
mechanism with respect to payments. Since the allocation only differs for x such that
xB ≥ gB(0) ≥ xS and the posted price allocation rule prescribes dB(x) = 1 for such
x (see also Figure 3), the posted price mechanism also dominates the old mechanism
with respect to the allocation rule.
In contrast to Theorem 1, this result shows that a posted price mechanism is optimal
for any type distribution. The difference is due to the stronger individual rationality
constraint. While any allocation rule is compatible with (IR), the stronger constraint
(IR’) in the trade setting restricts the set of allocation rules that can be implemented
without a budget deficit. Within this smaller class of feasible allocation rules, for any
distribution of types a posted price mechanism is optimal.
The stronger individual rationality constraint also implies that mechanisms which
do not allocate the object are infeasible. This is because if the buyer does not get
the object, no money can be collected to compensate the seller for losing the object.
Therefore, assuming that the object is always allocated is without loss of generality in
this setting.
7. Discussion
We have studied the trade-off between efficiency and budget-balancedness in an inde-
pendent private values auction model. We incorporated this into the model by letting
the social welfare objective function include all payments, that is, by maximizing resid-
ual surplus.6 We showed that, if one focuses on robust implementation in dominant
strategies, an increasing hazard rate condition on agents’ type distributions guarantees
a resolution of the trade-off completely in favor of a balanced budget. In addition,
budget-balanced mechanisms have a very simple form and can easily be implemented
as posted price or option mechanisms. Further, we showed without any assumption on
the prior distribution of types that a posted price mechanism is optimal in the bilateral
trade setting. Our results imply that our approach of optimal mechanism design yields
higher welfare than approaches concentrating on the efficient allocation.
In the section on robustness we have seen that while the restriction to deterministic
and ex-post individually rational mechanisms is not crucial for our main result, it is
primarily driven by the focus on strategy-proof mechanisms that satisfy the ex-post
no-deficit constraint: Without these constraints, in many settings the first-best can be
achieved. This shows that these two restrictions are relatively costly in terms of welfare.
An interesting open question is how the result generalizes to a model including more
than two agents. We strongly believe that the optimal mechanism will still be budget-
balanced. An important argument for this is that, as the number of agents gets large,
the efficient allocation can be approximated in a budget-balanced way: in the spirit
of McAfee (1992), allocate efficiently while ignoring one agent who then receives all
payments from the other agents. This can be implemented by tentatively giving the
6For other ways to analyze the frontier that describes possible ways to resolve this trade-off, see,
for example, Diakonikolas, Papadimitriou, Pierrakos and Singer (2012) or Tatur (2005).
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object to one of the agents and then simulating a second price auction with reserve
price where this agent sells the object to the remaining agents.
Appendix
The following lemma enables us to approximate any mechanism with mechanisms from
the class M0.
Lemma 3. For every mechanism M = (d, p) and for every ε > 0 there exists a mech-
anism M˜ = (d˜, p˜) in M0 such that U(M)− U(M˜) < ε.
Proof. Let the mechanism M = (d, p) and ε > 0 be given and let g1(x2) and g2(x1) be
defined as above. Define Di := {x ∈ X : di(x) = 1} as the set of type profiles where
agent i gets the object and define D˜i similarly. Since g2 is a monotone function it can
be approximated uniformly by a monotone step function g˜2. Denote the associated
allocation rule by d˜. By choosing the step width small enough the approximation can
be done such that for given δ > 0,
||g1 − g˜1||∞ < δ and ||g2 − g˜2||∞ < δ
holds. The approximation can be chosen such that gi(x−i) = x¯i implies g˜i(x−i) = x¯i
and g˜ can be chosen such that g˜2 ≤ g2, implying that D˜1 ⊂ D1.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that q2(x1) ≡ 0 (see Step 1 in the proof of
Lemma 2). By construction of g˜2 and since M satisfies (ND), we can define functions
q˜i(x−i) such that q˜2(x1) ≡ 0, 0 ≤ q˜1(x2) ≤ infx1{g˜1(x2)d˜1(x1, x2) + g˜2(x1)d˜2(x1, x2)}
∀x2 ∈ X2 and ||q˜1 − q1||∞ < δ. We then have:
U(d, p)− U(d˜, p˜) ≤
∫
X
q1(x2)− q˜1(x2) dF (x)
+
∫
D1
x1 − g1(x2) dF (x)−
∫
D˜1
x1 − g˜1(x2) dF (x)
+
∫
D2
x2 − g2(x1) dF (x)−
∫
D˜2
x2 − g˜2(x1) dF (x)
≤ δ +
∫
D1\D˜1
x1 − g1(x2) dF (x) +
∫
D˜1
δ dF (x)
+
∫
D˜2\D2
x2 − g2(x1) dF (x) +
∫
D2
δ dF (x)
≤ 3δ +B1x1δ +B2x2δ,
where Bi is an upper bound for fi(xi). Hence, by choosing δ <
ε
3+B1x1+B2x2
, it follows
that U(d, p)− U(d˜, p˜) < ε.
We combine the approximation lemma with Lemma 2 in order to prove the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 1. Without loss of generality, we restrict ourselves to posted price
mechanisms for agent 2. We first establish that U maps the set of all posted price
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mechanisms to a compact subset of R. Let a¯ = min{x¯1, x¯2} and let a ∈ [0, a¯] be some
price for a posted price mechanism Ma. Then U(Ma) can be written as
U(Ma) =
∫ a
0
∫ x¯2
a
x2dF (x) +
∫ x¯1
0
∫ a
0
x1dF (x) +
∫ x¯1
a
∫ x¯2
a
x1dF (x).
Due to the continuity of F , this function is continuous with respect to a. Since [0, a¯] is
compact, so is {U(Ma) | a ∈ [0, a¯]} and therefore there exists an a∗ such that U(Ma∗)
is maximal among all posted prices.
Next, assume that the theorem is false, i.e., there exists a mechanism M and ε > 0
such that U(M) > U(Ma∗) + ε. Then apply Lemma 3 to M and ε to get a mechanism
M˜ ∈ M0 with U(M˜) > U(Ma∗). This contradicts Lemma 2, establishing the theorem.
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Chapter 4
Substitutes and Complements in Trading
Networks
We generalize the full substitutes condition used in the trading network
model of Hatfield et al. (2013) to a condition that we call full substitutes and
complements (see Sun and Yang 2006). If all agents’ preferences satisfy full
substitutes and complements, competitive equilibria can be shown to exist
and all desirable results about competitive equilibria carry over to the model
with more diverse preferences: The welfare theorems hold and, under the full
substitutes and complements condition, competitive equilibrium outcomes
are precisely those that are stable.
1. Introduction
This chapter builds on the trading network model introduced by Hatfield et al. (2013).
Their model is itself based on a hierarchy of models that analyze the concepts of compet-
itive equilibrium, core and stability in markets with indivisible items: In the assignment
model (Shapley and Shubik 1971, Gale 1960, Koopmans and Beckmann 1957), there
is a set of sellers who each have an item for sale and a set of potential buyers with
a willingness to pay for each item. The efficient allocation of items can be supported
by Walrasian equilibrium prices and the outcomes induced by these prices correspond
exactly to the stable outcomes and the core of the assignment game.
When buyers express their preferences over whole bundles of items, the gross sub-
stitutes property ensures that competitive equilibrium prices supporting the efficient
allocation of items continue to exist (Kelso and Crawford 1982). Gul and Stacchetti
(1999) show that these prices can be chosen such that they are anonymous in the sense
that different buyers would pay the same price for a given item. The gross substitutes
condition says that buyers view the items as substitutes, requiring that if the price
for some item rises a buyer will not decrease his demand for all other items. Ostro-
vski (2008) recognized that the bilateral structure inherent in the previous auction and
matching models can be extended to supply chains: Stable outcomes and equilibria
still exist if agents view trades on the same side of the market as substitutes for each
other but upstream trades as complementing downstream trades. Hatfield et al. (2013)
generalize the trading relationships to arbitrary network structures where every agent
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may engage in various sell and/or buy relationships with other agents.
Sun and Yang (2006) generalize the model of Kelso and Crawford (1982) in a dif-
ferent way. They show that there is a condition on preferences that is more general
than gross substitutes and still guarantees the existence of Walrasian equilibria: The
items to be sold can be divided into two classes (tables and chairs) and all buyers view
items within a class as substitutes for each other and items across classes as comple-
ments (gross substitutes and complements). Since the partition into classes is the same
for each buyer, this result could escape known necessity results for the existence of
Walrasian equilibria (Milgrom 2000, Gul and Stacchetti 1999).
This chapter unifies both generalizations of the Kelso and Crawford (1982) economy
into one model while escaping the necessity result for the existence of Walrasian equi-
libria given in Hatfield et al. (2013). We show that there is an analogue version of the
gross substitutes and complements property tailored to the trading network economy
(full substitutes and complements), such that a Walrasian equilibrium is guaranteed to
exist.
The model considered in this chapter is the same as in Hatfield et al. (2013): There
is a set of agents who each may engage in a set of possible trading relationships in
which they are either the seller or the buyer. The agents have cardinal preferences
over subsets of the possible trades. A price can be associated with each trade and
this induces a quasi-linear utility function for each agent. The interpretation of the
full substitutes condition introduced by Hatfield et al. (2013) is that agents view the
items underlying all possible trades as substitutes for each other. This means that if
the price for some item that an agent is buying increases, she will increase her demand
for items in other trades that she is currently involved in: She will buy more and
sell less of the other items. Thus, the fact that an agent takes the role of a seller in
one trade and that of a buyer in another trade leads to an apparent complementarity
between trades on different sides of the market. However, the items underlying the
trades are substitutes for the agent. The full substitutes and complements condition
introduced in this chapter generalizes this in the same way the gross substitutes and
complements condition (Sun and Yang 2006) generalizes gross substitutes: The items
underlying all possible trades are partitioned into two classes, so that there are, e. g.,
“software” and “hardware” products. Buyers view different software products as being
substitutes to each other but complemented by hardware. This means that if the price
for a piece of hardware that an agent buys rises, he will weakly increase his demand
for other hardware and weakly decrease his demand for software. In terms of trading
relationships, this means that the agent will buy more and sell less hardware, and buy
less and sell more software. Similar as above, this leads to apparent substitutability
between hardware trades on one side of the market and software trades on the other
side of the market although the underlying items are complements to each other.
We are able to show that when all agents’ preferences satisfy the full substitutes
and complements condition there always exists a Walrasian equilibrium. The proof for
this result has the same structure as the proof in Hatfield et al. (2013): For a given
network, a reduced bilateral economy is constructed in which trades are treated as the
items that are for sale. The core of the proof then consists of showing that prefer-
ences in the reduced economy satisfy the gross substitutes and complements condition.
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Applying the results in Sun and Yang (2006) implies that in the reduced economy a
Walrasian equilibrium exists which can be lifted back to the original economy. The way
we generalize preferences circumvents the necessity result for the existence of compet-
itive equilibria since its proof relies on constructing preferences for agents who do not
all view the same items as complementing each other.
We also show that the results in Hatfield et al. (2013) regarding the connection
between competitive equilibrium and stability carries over to our assumption on pref-
erences. While competitive equilibrium outcomes are always stable, the assumption of
full substitutes and complements preferences ensures that the allocation of every stable
outcome can be supported in Walrasian equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that if an
agent is indifferent about the identity of his trading partners (i.e., he wants to sell an
item but does not care about who the buyer is) then there exists a competitive equilib-
rium in which all these trades occur at the same price. This implies that all bilateral
auction models (Sun and Yang 2006, Gul and Stacchetti 1999) are strictly contained in
our setting because the result implies that in competitive equilibrium, every item that
is for sale can be assigned exactly one price.
Recently, efforts have been successful towards a full characterization of the types of
preferences such that a competitive equilibrium exists (Baldwin and Klemperer 2013).
While this result can alternatively be used to derive our main result, the character-
ization is a geometric condition on the valuation function and not easy to interpret
economically.
The chapter is structured as follows: In Section 2 we present the model and for-
mally introduce the full substitutes and complements condition. Section 3 presents the
existence result, describes the reduction to the bilateral economy and also explains how
the result relates to previous reductions to the Kelso and Crawford (1982) model. In
Section 4 we deal with the construction of anonymous competitive equilibrium prices
and analyze the relationship between the concepts of competitive equilibrium and sta-
bility. All proofs related to Section 4 are relegated to the appendix. Finally, Section 5
presents a discussion of the results.
2. Environment
There is a set of agents I and a set of possible trades Ω which are exogenously given.
A trade ω ∈ Ω is an ordered pair of agents ω = (sω, bω), where sω and bω are the seller
and the buyer of the trade ω, respectively. Thus, the agents and the set of trades can
be thought of as a directed multigraph, where I is the set of vertices and Ω is the set
of edges.
The trades Ω are partitioned into two classes, Ω = Ω1unionsqΩ2, where we think of Ω1 as
the possible software trades and of Ω2 as the set of possible hardware trades. A price
vector p ∈ RΩ specifies a price for every trade ω ∈ Ω, and we write pω = p(ω). An
arrangement (Ψ, p) is a subset of trades Ψ ⊆ Ω together with a price vector p.
Some notation that will be used quite often: Let A ⊆ Ω. Then we write A1 = A∩Ω1
for the software trades in A, A→i = {(s, b) ∈ A | b = i} for the trades in A that agent i
buys, Ai→ = {(s, b) ∈ A | s = i} for the trades in A that agent i sells, Ai = A→i ∪ Ai→
for all trades agent i is involved in, and A1i→ = Ai→ ∩ Ω1 for the software trades in A
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that agent i sells (similarly, define A1→i and A
1
i ).
Preferences
Every agent i has a valuation function ui : 2
Ωi → R over sets of trades Ai ⊆ Ωi.1
Together with a price vector p, the valuation function induces the quasilinear utility
function Ui over sets of trades A and prices p, defined as
Ui(A, p) := ui(Ai) +
∑
ω∈Ai→
pω −
∑
ω∈A→i
pω.
For convenience, we will sometimes write
p(Ai→) =
∑
ω∈Ai→
pω and p(A→i) =
∑
ω∈A→i
pω,
as well as p(A) = p(Ai→) − p(A→i). The utility function Ui allows us to define agent
i’s demand correspondence, specifying which sets of trades maximize the agent’s utility,
given prices p:
Di(p) := arg max
A⊆Ωi
Ui(A, p)
For our definition of the full substitutes and complements condition we will use
an analogue of the indicator language full substitutes (IFS) property of Hatfield et al.
(2013), since it is the easiest to understand and interpret.2 To this end, define for each
agent i the indicator function e(A) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}Ωi for a set of trades A ⊆ Ωi as
eω(A) =

−1 if ω ∈ Ai→
0 if ω /∈ A
1 if ω ∈ A→i
ω ∈ Ωi.
The indicator function notation can be interpreted such that the agent demands a
positive amount of an item if it is contained in a buy trade, and that he demands a
negative amount of the item if it is contained in a sell trade.
Definition 1. A valuation function ui satisfies the full substitutes and complements
(FSC) property, if the following conditions hold:
1. Take two price vectors p ≤ q, where pω = qω for ω ∈ Ω2. Then for all A ∈ Di(p)
there exists B ∈ Di(q) such that
eω(A) ≤ eω(B) for all ω ∈ Ω1i with pω = qω,
eω(A) ≥ eω(B) for all ω ∈ Ω2i .
(1)
1For simplicity, we do not allow the valuation functions to take on the value minus infinity, which
would model technological constraints on the set of trades an agent may engage in. However, doing
this is with no loss of generality, since, similarly as in Hatfield et al. (2013), one can transform an
unbounded valuation function to one of those we consider.
2In order to keep this chapter short, we will not delve into showing equivalence to the various
analogues of choice language full substitutability and demand language full substitutability. All proofs
presented in this chapter are adapted to use only the definition given below.
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2. The above condition also holds if the sets Ω1 and Ω2 are exchanged.
The condition requires that, if prices for software trades go up, then the agent in-
creases his demand for other software products whose price remained constant (because
they are substitutes), and the agent decreases his demand for hardware products (be-
cause they are complements to software products that got more expensive). Note that
for the case where Ω = Ω1 and Ω2 = ∅, FSC reduces to the full substitutes condition.
3. Existence of Competitive Equilibria
In this section we prove that in an economy where each agent’s preference satisfies the
FSC condition, there exists a competitive equilibrium.
Definition 2. An arrangement (Ψ, p) is a competitive equilibrium if for all agents
i ∈ I,
Ψi ∈ Di(p).
In other words, a competitive equilibrium is a price vector p and a set of trades Ψ
such that each agent demands the set of trades from Ψ he is involved in at the price
vector p. The following theorem holds:
Theorem 1. Let (I,Ω, {ui}i∈I) be a trading network economy such that for all agents
i ∈ I, ui satisfies the FSC condition. Then there exists a competitive equilibrium.
The proof proceeds in two major steps, which parallel the proof given in Hatfield
et al. (2013). First, we construct the reduced economy and show that every agent’s
utility in this economy satisfies the gross substitutes and complements condition defined
in Sun and Yang (2006). Using the equilibrium of the reduced economy, we then
construct an arrangement for the original economy and show that it is a competitive
equilibrium.
Step 1: Constructing the Reduced Economy
We first briefly describe the kind of economies that are studied in Sun and Yang (2006):
There is a set of agents J and a set of items S that can be partitioned into two sets
S = S1 unionsq S2. Agent i ∈ J has a valuation function vi : 2S → R over sets of objects
which, together with a price vector p ∈ RS, also induces a quasi-linear utility function
Vi with
Vi(A, p) := vi(A)−
∑
a∈A
pa, A ⊆ S.
The demand correspondence in this economy is defined as above (with respect to Vi)
and denoted Ei(p).
Definition 3. The valuation function vi of agent i satisfies the gross substitutes and
complements (GSC) condition, if the following holds:
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1. Fix price vectors p ≤ q such that pa = qa for all a ∈ S2. Then for every A ∈ Ei(p)
there exists B ∈ Ei(q) such that
{a ∈ A1 | pa = qa} ⊆ B1 and
A2 ⊇ B2. (2)
2. The above condition holds if the sets S1 and S2 are exchanged.
Definition 4. A competitive equilibrium is a price vector p together with a partition
S = X1 unionsq · · · unionsqXJ of S (a set Xi may be empty) and such that
Xi ∈ Ei(p) for all i ∈ J.
Now given a trading network economy (I,Ω, {ui}i∈I), we describe how it is trans-
formed into the two-sided economy (J, S, {vi}i∈J). First set J = I and S1 = Ω1, S2 =
Ω2, that is, the set of agents in the two-sided economy is the set of agents in the network
economy and the set of objects is the set of trades from the network economy (keeping
the distinction between software and hardware trades).
Next, we define the new valuation functions vi, i ∈ J = I, through
vi(A) := ui(A→i ∪ (Ac)i→)− ui(Ωi→) if A ⊆ Ωi,
and vi(A) = Π otherwise, where Π is some number low enough such that the agent will
never demand such a bundle. Such a number exists since there are only finitely many
value the functions ui can attain, and since by the definition of vi we have vi(∅) = 0,
which is also required in the model of Sun and Yang (2006).
Let us for some set A ⊆ Ωi define A# := A→i ∪ (Ac)i→. Then it follows that
(A#)# = A and vi(A) = ui(A
#)− ui(Ωi→).
Lemma 1. For each agent i ∈ J , if the valuation functions ui satisfy property FSC,
then the valuation function vi satisfies property GSC with respect to S
1 unionsq S2.
Proof. First note that by the definition of vi it follows that for any price vector p and
any set of trades A ⊆ Ωi,
A ∈ Di(p) ⇔ A# ∈ Ei(p). (3)
To see this, we write
Vi(A
#, p) = vi(A
#)− p(A#)
= ui(A)− ui(Ωi→)−
(
p(A→i) + p(Ωi)− p(Ai→)
)
= Ui(A, p) + const.
Hence, A maximizes Ui if and only if A
# maximizes Vi.
Now fix any two price vectors p ≤ q such that pa = qa for all a ∈ S2, and pick a
set A ∈ Ei(p). We have to find a set B ∈ Ei(q) fulfilling condition (2). Since by (3),
A# ∈ Di(p) we can plug it into the definition of FSC and get a set B# ∈ Di(q) fulfilling
condition (1).
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We claim that B = (B#)# ∈ Ej(q) is the desired set. Consider ω ∈ Ω1→i with
pω = qω. Then condition (1) together with the definition of the indicator function says
ω ∈ (A#)1→i = A1→i ⇒ ω ∈ (B#)1→i = B1→i.
Similarly, if ω ∈ Ω1i→, we have
ω /∈ (A#)1i→ = (Ac)1i→ ⇒ ω /∈ (B#)1i→ = (Bc)1i→,
which translates to ω ∈ A1i→ ⇒ ω ∈ B1i→. Putting both implications together, we have
shown that {ω ∈ A1 | pω = qω} ⊆ B1.
The cases where ω ∈ Ω2i are treated analogously, showing that A2 ⊇ B2, which
means that B fulfills condition (2).
Step 2: Constructing the Equilibrium
Since valuation functions in the reduced economy (J, S, {vi}i∈I) satisfy the GSC condi-
tion, by Theorem 3.1 in Sun and Yang (2006), there exists a competitive equilibrium
with price vector p and partition S = X1 unionsq · · · unionsqXJ . Note that in such an equilibrium,
all objects/trades are assigned to some agent.
For some trade ω let µ(ω) be the agent who receives the trade in equilibrium, i.e.,
ω ∈ Xµ(ω). Also, let b(ω) be the buyer agent of trade ω in the network economy, and
let s(ω) be the seller agent, i.e., ω = (s(ω), b(ω)). Note that every trade is assigned to
one agent, and by the construction of vi every trade is either assigned to its buying or
its selling agent.
Now construct the arrangement (Ψ, p∗) of the network economy as follows: Set
p∗ := p and Ψ := {ω ∈ S = Ω | µ(ω) = b(ω)}.
Lemma 2. The arrangement (Ψ, p∗) constitutes a competitive equilibrium of the trading
network economy.
Proof. By construction of the two-sided market and Ψ, in equilibrium, agent i receives
the trades Ψ#i in the equilibrium of the two-sided economy, i.e., Xi = Ψ
#
i . Since p
∗
and {Xi}i∈I is an equilibrium of the reduced economy, we have Ψ#i ∈ Ei(p∗), implying
Ψi ∈ Di(p∗). Hence, (Ψ, p∗) is an equilibrium of the original economy.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Relation to Previous Reductions
In this section we aim to explain how the above reduction relates to previous reductions
to the Kelso and Crawford (1982) model. This also helps to understand in what way
the present chapter unifies both Hatfield et al. (2013) and Sun and Yang (2006).
We begin by explaining the reduction of Hatfield et al. (2013). In their model, all
the goods underlying the trades are substitutes for the agents. The only difference to
Kelso and Crawford (1982) is the network structure and that agents can be involved
in trades in which they are sellers. Therefore, the main purpose of the reduction is to
translate the network structure into a two-sided economy where every agent only buys
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Ω→i
Ωi→
FS
Ω→i
Ωi→
GS
u(0,−1)
u(0, 0)
u(1,−1)
u(1, 0)
(a) Reduction from full substitutes (FS) to
gross substitutes (GS) in Hatfield et al.
(2013).
S1
S2
GSC
S1
S2
GS
u(0, 1)
u(0, 0)
u(1, 1)
u(1, 0)
(b) Reduction from gross substitutes
and complements to gross substitutes in
Sun and Yang (2006).
Ω→i
Ωi→
FSC
Ω→i
Ωi→
GSC
u(0,−1)
u(0, 0)
u(1,−1)
u(1, 0)
(c) The reduction in this chapter.
Figure 1: Schematic illustration of the reductions. Original valuations (u) are shown
on the left hand side, transformed valuations (v) on the right hand side. The gray
labels indicate where the function values of v come from.
items. We demonstrate this by writing down the model in an equivalent way, as is
suggested by the buy/sell structure and the definition of the indicator function e(A).
We translate every valuation function ui to a valuation function u
′
i : Xi → R as
follows (cf. Baldwin and Klemperer 2013): The new domain is some subset
Xi ⊆ {x ∈ {−1, 0, 1}Ωi | xω = 1⇒ ω ∈ A→i, xω = −1⇒ ω ∈ Ai→},
and we set u′i(x) = ui(Ai) if x can be expressed as x = e(Ai) for some Ai ⊆ Ωi. If we
define U ′i(x, p) = u
′
i(x) − p · x, then for the respective demand correspondence D′i it is
easy to see that
Ai ∈ Di(p) ⇔ e(Ai) ∈ D′i(p),
so in this sense ui and u
′
i are equivalent. Clearly, for the valuation functions u
′
i, an
adapted definition of the full substitutes condition can be formulated and the valua-
tion functions for the reduced economy would then be defined as follows (ignoring the
normalization term; see Figure 1a):
v′i(x) = u
′
i(x− e(Ωi→))
It is then also clear that v′i satisfies the gross substitutes condition whenever u
′
i satisfies
full substitutes, since it is invariant with respect to a shift of the domain.
In Sun and Yang (2006), the economy is reduced to the one in Kelso and Crawford
(1982) by essentially “mirroring” the valuation function along the axes of one part of
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the goods. This is also illustrated in Figure 1b. In contrast to Hatfield et al. (2013),
the purpose of this reduction is not to transform a buy/sell economy to a buy-only
economy. Also, goods in different sets are genuine complements to each other, whereas
in Hatfield et al. (2013) all goods are substitutes. The interpretation that buy and sell
trades complement each other is suggested by the network structure.
Analogous to the reduction in Hatfield et al. (2013), the purpose of the reduction
in this chapter is to translate the network structure to a two-sided structure: If the
model was written in terms of the valuation functions u′i above, the reduction could
be illustrated by Figure 1c. The result is that the goods underlying the trades in the
economy can be divided into two parts, where goods in different parts complement
each other. Additionally, in the same way the Sun and Yang (2006) model cannot be
extended to more than two sets of goods, the network model cannot be extended to
more than two sets of items underlying the trades.
Welfare Theorems
Since the welfare theorems are independent of the notion of FSC, the same results as
in Hatfield et al. (2013) still hold in our setting. We call a set of trades Φ ⊆ Ω efficient,
if it satisfies ∑
i∈I
ui(Φ) ≥
∑
i∈I
ui(A) for all A ⊆ Ω.
Theorem 2 (First Welfare Theorem). Let (Ψ, p) be a competitive equilibrium. Then
the set of trades Ψ is efficient.
Theorem 3 (Second Welfare Theorem). Suppose the agents’ preferences satisfy FSC
(so that a competitive equilibrium exists). Then for any competitive equilibrium (Ψ, p)
and every efficient set of trades Φ, (Φ, p) is a competitive equilibrium.
4. Anonymous Prices and Stability
In this section we confirm that all the theorems in Hatfield et al. (2013) concerning the
existence of anonymous prices and the relation to stable outcomes carry over to our
model. Since the proofs are mostly similar to those in Hatfield et al. (2013), we defer
them to the appendix.
Anonymous Prices
In order for our model to generalize the preceding models (Gul and Stacchetti 1999, Sun
and Yang 2006, in particular), one needs to establish that under certain circumstances
competitive equilibria with anonymous prices exist. For instance, in the model of Gul
and Stacchetti (1999), an object (which we would model as an agent) has no “prefer-
ences” over which agent it is sold to and can only be sold once. Also, in competitive
equilibrium, the object should only be assigned one price, which is the same as say-
ing that all trades with the same object should have the same price in competitive
equilibrium. Therefore, we define the following (analogous to Hatfield et al. 2013):
Definition 5. For agent i ∈ I, the trades in the set A ⊆ Ωi are
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1. mutually incompatible, if B /∈ Di(p) for all p and for all B ⊆ Ωi with |B∩A| > 1,
2. perfect substitutes, if ui(B ∪ {a}) = ui(B ∪ {a′}) for all B ⊆ Ωi \ A and for all
a, a′ ∈ A.
Mutual incompatibility says that the agent will never demand a set which contains
two or more trades from A. Perfect substitutability says that an agent receives the
same marginal utility from any of the items in A. Clearly, we would model an object
in an auction with preferences that satisfy precisely mutual incompatibility and perfect
substitutability for all trades it can “engage in:” the object can only be sold once and
it does not matter for the object to which agent it is sold to.
The following theorem says that there exist competitive equilibria where trades that
are mutually incompatible and perfect substitutes for an agent all have the same price.
Theorem 4. Let (Ψ, p) be a competitive equilibrium. Then, if the trades in A ⊆ Ωi are
mutually incompatible and perfect substitutes for agent i ∈ I, (Ψ, q) is also a competitive
equilibrium, where q is defined as
qa =

p = max
b∈Ai→
pb if a ∈ Ai→,
p = min
b∈A→i
pb if a ∈ A→i,
pa otherwise.
Stability and Competitive Equilibrium
In this section we show that the relationship between the concept of stability and
competitive equilibrium is preserved when generalizing to the full substitutes and com-
plements condition: Every set of trades that is formed in a competitive equilibrium
is stable and, if one imposes condition FSC, for every stable set of trades, there exist
prices that are competitive equilibrium prices for that set of trades.
In order to define stable sets, we introduce some more notation: a pair (ω, pω) ∈
Ω × R is called a contract and a set of contracts is called feasible, if there are no
two contracts consisting of the same trade. A feasible set of contracts Y is called an
outcome, and for such an outcome we can denote the contained set of trades by A and
the corresponding prices by the vector p ∈ RA. Then we write
Ui(Y ) := Ui(A, p)
for the utility derived from the set of contracts by agent i.
For an arbitrary set of contracts Y , the choice correspondence of agent i is defined
as
Ci(Y ) := arg max
feasible Z⊆Yi
Ui(Z).
We are now ready to define what a stable outcome is.
Definition 6. The outcome Y is stable, if it is
(a) individually rational: Yi ∈ Ci(Y ) for all i, and
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(b) unblocked: there is no feasible non-empty blocking set of contracts Z with Z∩Y =
∅ and such that for every agent i that is involved in contracts of Z, Zi ⊆ A for
all choices A ∈ Ci(Y ∪ Z).
Put differently, stability requires that all contracts are accepted by the agents being
part of them and that there is no possibility to propose a new set of different contracts
(a blocking set) where all contracts are accepted by all agents being part of the new
contracts (and who possibly drop some of the old contracts).
The result that any set of contracts induced by a competitive equilibrium is stable,
as well as its proof are independent of the agents’ preferences, hence we just state the
theorem without repeating the proof.
Theorem 5. Let Y be the outcome induced by the competitive equilibrium (Ψ, p). Then
Y is a stable outcome.
The converse, however, is not true unless we impose the full substitutes and com-
plements condition:
Theorem 6. Let condition FSC be satisfied and let Y be a stable outcome with associ-
ated trades Ψ and prices r. Then r can be extended to prices p for trades not in Ψ such
that (Ψ, p) is a competitive equilibrium.
5. Discussion
We have shown that the full substitutes condition can be generalized to a condition
similar to the gross substitutes and complements condition, still guaranteeing existence
of a competitive equilibrium. Competitive equilibria are efficient and every efficient set
of trades can be supported by competitive equilibrium prices. Further, if two trades are
mutually incompatible and perfect substitutes for one agent, they can be assumed to
have the same price in competitive equilibrium. Also, we have shown that the relation
between competitive equilibria and stable outcomes carries over to the model with more
general preferences: Competitive equilibria are stable, and if the preferences satisfy
full substitutes and complements, stable outcomes can be supported by competitive
equilibrium prices.
Due to the existence of anonymous prices, the model strictly contains and unifies all
the models that it builds upon: Hatfield et al. (2013) can be obtained by setting Ω1 = Ω
and Ω2 = ∅. Sun and Yang (2006) can be obtained directly by looking at a bipartite
network between the objects and the buyers. Trades between buyers and objects in
class 1 and 2 are put in Ω1 and Ω2, respectively. Note, that the economy of Sun and
Yang (2006) is directly contained in our model and no mapping into a different network
economy is needed to prove their result. While the preference assumptions of Kelso and
Crawford (1982) are generalized by Sun and Yang (2006), and the market structure is
generalized by Hatfield et al. (2013), the present chapter unifies these generalizations.
Also, in the samy way the result of Sun and Yang (2006) does not contradict Theo-
rem 2 in Gul and Stacchetti (1999), our result does not contradict Theorem 7 of Hatfield
et al. (2013). The reason for this is that GSC preferences in general do not contain
simple preferences, which are used to obtain the impossibility result.3
3For instance, in Example 2 in Hatfield et al. (2013), there is no possibility to partition trades into
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. We have to show that for all agents j ∈ I, Uj(Ψj, q) ≥ Uj(B, q) holds for all
B ⊆ Ωj. Let a and a be the trades attaining p and p, respectively. Since the trades in
A are mutually incompatible, |Ψj ∩A| ≤ 1. If we have an a ∈ Ψj ∩A, assume without
loss of generality a ∈ Ai→ (the other case is treated analogously). Then we know that
pa = p, since by perfect substitutability
ui(Ψi) = ui(Ψi \ {a} ∪ {a})
holds and therefore pa < p would contradict Ψi ∈ Di(p). It follows that the prices in
Ψj did not change and therefore
Uj(Ψj, q) = Uj(Ψj, p).
Now if j 6= i, we can derive for any B ⊆ Ωj that
Uj(Ψj, q) = Uj(Ψj, p) ≥ Uj(B, p) ≥ Uj(B, q),
where the last inequality follows from the fact that trades where j buys from i got
(weakly) more expensive and trades where j sells to i got (weakly) less expensive.
If, on the other hand, j = i, by mutual incompatibility, the only sets to consider
are B and B ∪ {a}, where B ⊆ Ωi \A and a ∈ A. Since prices in B did not change, we
have
Ui(Ψi, q) = Ui(Ψi, p) ≥ Ui(B, p) = Ui(B, q).
Also, by the definition of a and by perfect substitutability,
Ui(Ψi, q) = Ui(Ψi, p) ≥ Ui(B ∪ {a}, p) = Ui(B ∪ {a}, q) ≥ Ui(B ∪ {a}, q),
which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 6
The proof is adapted from Hatfield et al. (2013) and adjusted to our definition of full
substitutes and complements. We first prove two lemmas showing ways of modifying
the agents’ utility functions while preserving condition FSC.
Lemma 3. Let ui satisfy FSC and let Ψ be the set of trades and r be the price vector
of outcome Y . Define the valuation function uˆi on Ω \Ψ as
uˆi(Φ) := max
A⊆Ψ
{
ui(Φ ∪ A) + r(A)
}
.
Then uˆi satisfies FSC.
two sets such that all agents satisfy condition FSC: Since the trades ω and ψ are complements for
agent i, ω ∈ Ω1 and ψ ∈ Ω2. The preferences of s(ω) and s(ψ) require ωˆ ∈ Ω1 and ψˆ ∈ Ω2, which
means that agent j cannot have FSC preferences.
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Proof. Let Uˆi and Dˆi be the utility function and demand correspondence for the new
valuation function uˆi. For some set S ⊆ Ωi, denote Sˆ = S \ Ψ and let Sˆ∗ be the set
attaining the maximum in the definition of uˆi(Sˆ). Let pˆ ≤ qˆ be price vectors for Ω \Ψ
with pˆω = qˆω for ω ∈ Ω2 and let Aˆ ∈ Dˆi(pˆ). We have to find Bˆ ∈ Dˆi(qˆ) such that (1)
holds.
We claim that A = Aˆ∗∪ Aˆ ∈ Di(p), where p is the combination of the prices r and pˆ
(similarly for q). Assume on the contrary that there exists S with Ui(S, p) > Ui(A, p).
It follows from the definition of uˆ that
uˆi(Sˆ) + pˆ(Sˆ) ≥ ui
(
Sˆ ∪ (S ∩Ψ))+ r(S ∩Ψ) + pˆ(Sˆ)
= ui(S) + p(S)
> ui(A) + p(A) = uˆi(Aˆ) + pˆ(Aˆ),
which contradicts Aˆ ∈ Dˆi(pˆ).
Since ui satisfies FSC, there exists a set B ∈ Di(q) such that (1) holds. We claim that
Bˆ ∈ Dˆi(qˆ). Assume that this is not the case, i.e., there exists Sˆ with Uˆi(Sˆ, qˆ) > Uˆi(Bˆ, qˆ).
Then it follows from the definition of uˆi that
ui(Sˆ ∪ S∗) + r(S∗) + qˆ(Sˆ) > ui(Bˆ ∪ Bˆ∗) + r(Bˆ∗) + qˆ(Bˆ)
≥ ui(B) + q(B),
which contradicts B ∈ Di(q). Now because (1) holds for the sets A and B, it clearly
holds for the restrictions Aˆ and Bˆ.
Lemma 4. Let uˆi satisfy FSC and let δ > 0 be given. Define the valuation function u˜i
on Ω as
u˜i(Ψ) := uˆi(Ψ)− δ|Ψi|.
Then u˜i satisfies FSC.
Proof. Denote by U˜i and D˜i the corresponding utility function and demand correspon-
dence. For an arbitrary price p define p˜ through
p˜ω :=

pω − δ if ω ∈ Ωi→
pω + δ if ω ∈ Ω→i
pω otherwise.
Then we have U˜i(Φ, p) = Ui(Φ, p˜) and therefore
A ∈ Di(p˜) ⇔ A ∈ D˜i(p).
The lemma then follows from the observation that if the prices p, q satisfy the premises
of Definition 1, then the modified prices p˜, q˜ do so as well.
The rest of the proof is directly taken from Hatfield et al. (2013):
Proof of Theorem 6. As in Lemma 3, construct uˆi for all i ∈ I and let (Ψˆ, pˆ) be
a competitive equilibrium in the economy with trades Ω \ Ψ and valuation functions
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uˆi. If we can choose Ψˆ such that Ψˆ = ∅ we are done, since then, (Ψ, p) (where p
is the combination of r and pˆ) is a competitive equilibrium in the original economy:
∅ ∈ Dˆi(pˆ) implies that no agent wants to add trades not in Ψ, and individual rationality
of Y implies that no agent wants to drop a trade in Ψ.
However, if ∅ is not a competitive equilibrium, we know by Theorem 2 and 3 that
Ψˆ is efficient and ∅ is not. We can then define
ε :=
∑
i∈I
uˆi(Ψˆ)−
∑
i∈I
uˆi(∅) > 0
and set δ := ε
2|Ω| . Define u˜i as in Lemma 4. By the choice of δ, we know that∑
i∈I
u˜i(Ψˆ) >
∑
i∈I
u˜i(∅),
and therefore that ∅ is no competitive equilibrium for the valuations u˜i either. Hence,
a competitive equilibrium (Ψ˜, p˜) for the new valuations will satisfy Ψ˜ 6= ∅.
It follows that U˜i(Ψ˜, p˜) ≥ U˜i(Φ, p˜) for Φ ⊂ Ψ˜ and by the definition of u˜i we then
have Uˆi(Ψ˜, p˜) > Uˆi(Φ, p˜). We can now see that Z := {(ψ, p˜ψ)|ψ ∈ Ψ˜} is a blocking set:
By looking at the definition of uˆi, for every agent i, every choice A ∈ Ci(Y ∪ Z) has to
contain Zi. This contradicts the fact that Y is stable.
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Chapter 5
Discrete Convex Analysis and
Taˆtonnement for Economies with
Indivisibilities
We apply the theory of Discrete Convex Analysis to economies with indivis-
ibilities in order to derive a simple taˆtonnement process for settings where
agents have substitutes preferences over heterogeneous goods. Specifically,
we reinterpret the price adjustment process discovered by Ausubel (2006) in
terms of a steepest descent algorithm for the minimization of discrete con-
vex functions and generalize it to settings that allow agents to be producers
and/or consumers of multiple units of goods. We apply our model to the
substitutes and complements setting introduced by Sun and Yang (2009)
and the trading network economy of Hatfield et al. (2013).
1. Introduction
The idea of a taˆtonnement process that tentatively adjusts prices according to current
supply and demand was formulated by Walras (1874), and has since then been used
to derive ascending iterative auctions and methods for finding market-clearing prices.
Walras also realized that a form of substitutability of demand was needed for such a
process to work. For divisible goods, a formal description of a taˆtonnement process
and convergence results were first given by Samuelson (1947) and Arrow and Hurwicz
(1958). Similarly as in the first papers that established existence of a market-clearing
equilibrium (Arrow and Debreu 1954, McKenzie 1959), these results assume that the
preferences which induce demand satisfy certain notions of convexity.
In settings with indivisible goods, the first formal taˆtonnement process was an al-
gorithm described by Kelso and Crawford (1982) for the allocation of workers to firms.
They realized that sufficient for convergence in these settings is that the agents’ demand
satisfies the gross substitutes condition. In subsequent papers, different algorithms were
developed for the same condition (Gul and Stacchetti 1999, Ausubel 2006, Milgrom
and Strulovici 2009). As observed recently by Fujishige and Yang (2003), the demand
function of an agent satisfies gross substitution precisely if the valuation function that
describes the agent’s preferences is M \-concave (that is, it belongs to a class of well-
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behaved discrete concave functions). In this chapter, we make use of this connection
in order to apply the theory of Discrete Convex Analysis to the design and analysis
of discrete taˆtonnement processes, and argue that this connection is the driving force
behind the convergence results in discrete settings.
To be more precise, we look at economies where every agent has quasi-linear pref-
erences over the consumption and production of bundles of goods. The economy may
initially be endowed with arbitrary quantities of the goods in order to model auction
environments, and we assume that individuals are endowed with a sufficient amount of
money so that they will never face budget constraints and are able to buy any bundle of
goods as they wish. The chapter makes use of the theory of Discrete Convex Analysis
in order to interpret the auction developed by Ausubel (2006) as a steepest descent
algorithm for the conjugate of the aggregate valuation function. Based on deep results
from Discrete Convex Analysis, we can give simple and intuitive proofs for the conver-
gence properties, and further are able to generalize Ausubel’s process to more general
settings. In particular, we argue that an M \-convex function is the appropriate exten-
sion of a gross substitutes valuation function to multiple units of goods. This extension
has several advantages: First, it implies that the taˆtonnement process generates linear
prices for multiple units of goods (as in Milgrom and Strulovici 2009). This contrasts
the work of Ausubel (2006), who treats every unit of every good as a separate item
and therefore generates non-linear prices, as well as unnecessarily increases the com-
plexity of the auction. Second, and more important for the applications we present,
it allows for models where agents have preferences over negative amounts of goods (so
that some agents may be buyers and/or sellers), as well as models that do not satisfy
the assumption of free disposal.
In particular, with the latter two features we can gain the following important
insights: First, the double-track adjustment process proposed by Sun and Yang (2009),
which works for two classes of goods such that items in the same class are substitutes
and items in different classes are complements to each other, can be obtained by just
“mirroring” all valuation functions along the axes of the goods in one class. Thereby, our
algorithm also generalizes the double-track process to multiple units of goods. Second,
our algorithm can immediately be applied to the trading network economy of Hatfield
et al. (2013) by recognizing that their full substitutes condition is equivalent to the
convexity assumption we use in this chapter.
The interpretation of taˆtonnement processes as discrete steepest descent algorithms
also has the advantage that statements about the algorithmic complexity of the process
can be made. Further, efficient scaling techniques can be applied which yield adjustment
processes that only need to state a strongly polynomial number of ask prices, albeit at
the cost of monotone convergence.
M \-convexity turns out to be the right notion of convexity in the discrete setting
because M \-convex functions exhibit several properties that are important for the estab-
lishment of a discrete price adjustment process. First, the class of M \-convex functions
is closed under aggregation, which implies that aggregate demand shares the same prop-
erties as every agent’s demand. Since therefore, aggregate demand is convex,1 every
bundle of goods is demanded at some price, which means that a competitive equilib-
1The appropriate notion is convex-extensibility, see Definition 3 below.
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rium exists. The notion of M \-convexity is, however, too strong to be necessary for the
existence of competitive equilibria. We refer to Danilov, Koshevoy and Murota (2001)
and Baldwin and Klemperer (2013) for a complete characterization of the classes of
valuation functions that guarantee existence of an equilibrium. M \-convex functions
provide, additionally, the appropriate combinatorial properties such as convexity and
submodularity of the aggregate indirect utility function which are key for the (mono-
tone) convergence of discrete steepest descent algorithms.
Another key property that is implied by M \-convexity is that the optimal descent
direction of the indirect utility function at a given price is entirely determined by the
aggregate demand correspondence. Therefore, even though indirect utility cannot be
elicited directly, the steepest descent algorithm is economically suitable because it can
proceed through best response information from the agents. While the algorithm in
this chapter guarantees convergence to an equilibrium if the agents reveal their demand
truthfully, it does not incentivize them to do so. The algorithm is therefore suitable for
settings where agents can be assumed to have no market power and therefore to act as
price takers (Klemperer 2010), but can also be seen as an attempt to understand how
natural adjustment dynamics work in settings with indivisible goods.
Steepest descent methods for the design of iterative auctions are complemented by
primal-dual and linear programming algorithms (Demange, Gale and Sotomayor 1986,
Gul and Stacchetti 1999, Parkes and Ungar 2000, deVries, Schummer and Vohra 2007)
and related to algorithms for finding stable outcomes in matching models (Gale and
Shapley 1962, Ostrovski 2008).
Illustration: Convexity and Taˆtonnement
The role of convexity and conjugacy in the establishment of a price adjustment process
can best be described visually by means of a valuation function with a continuous
domain. In order to keep things simple, we assume that the aggregate valuation function
v of a group of agents over quantities x of a single good is given (see Figure 1). Aggregate
utility is quasi-linear, and therefore a competitive equilibrium price for endowment x¯ is
a price p∗ such that x¯ maximizes the expression v(x) − p∗x, i.e., a price such that the
agents demand a quantity of precisely x¯. Alternatively, the maximization problem of
the agents can be written as maximizing the linear function (−p, 1)T (x, y) over points
(x, y) such that y ≤ v(x). Since v is concave, it is then clear that for an equilibrium
price p∗, the vector (−p∗, 1) will be perpendicular to the tangent of the convex set
V = {(x, y) | y ≤ v(x)} at the point (x¯, v(x¯)). It is then also clear that concavity of v
guarantees that an equilibrium price exists for every endowment.
In order to derive a process that converges to the equilibrium price we look at the
indirect utility at price p, which is defined as U(p) = maxx v(x) − px. If x∗ attains
the maximum, we can write v(x∗) = U(p) + px∗ and therefore U(p) is the intercept
of the tangent of the set V at the point (x∗, v(x∗)). Also, since v is concave, we can
see from Figure 1 that the value v(x) can be recovered from the intercepts U(p) via
v(x) = minp U(p) + px. This is called conjugacy and the functions v and U are said to
be conjugate to each other. Since U is defined as the maximum over a family of linear
functions, it will be convex.
If p∗ is an equilibrium price for endowment x¯, then v(x¯)−p∗x¯ = U(p∗) and therefore,
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Figure 1: Concavity and conjugacy.
because of conjugacy, p∗ attains minp U(p) + px¯. Equilibrium prices can therefore be
found by computing a minimizer of the function h(p) = U(p) + px¯. Since U is convex,
h is convex as well, and there are well-developed algorithms for minimizing convex
functions. Some examples are steepest descent and gradient methods.
This chapter demonstrates that these considerations can be applied to valuation
functions with discrete domains as well by using the theory of Discrete Convex Analy-
sis. We proceed as follows: Section 2 introduces the notation and basic model. Different
restrictions on preferences that are equivalent to gross substitutes are discussed in Sec-
tion 3. Section 4 provides a brief introduction to Discrete Convex Analysis. Then, Sec-
tion 5 covers the existence and properties of competitive equilibria. Section 6 presents
the price adjustment process. Finally, in Section 7, we apply our results and conclude
in Section 8.
2. Basic Model
In this section we introduce the notation that is used throughout the chapter and
present the basic economy. We also define the concept of competitive equilibrium.
Notation
Let E be some finite ground set and consider the vector space RE. For some vector
x ∈ RE and element e ∈ E, we write xe = x(e) for the eth component of x. By
x−e ∈ RE\{e} we mean the vector x without component e. We define the characteristic
vector 1S ∈ RE of S ⊆ E as
1S(e) =
{
1 if e ∈ S
0 otherwise.
For an element e ∈ E, we simply write 1e = 1{e} and by convention we write 10 =
(0, . . . , 0). The maximum norm of a vector x ∈ RE is defined as ||x||∞ = maxe∈E |x(e)|.
For two vectors x, y ∈ RE, x ≤ y means x(e) ≤ y(e) for all e ∈ E, and x < y means
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x ≤ y and x(e) < y(e) for some e ∈ E. Given some subset S ⊆ RE, the indicator
function δS is defined as
δS(x) =
{
0 if x ∈ S
∞ otherwise.
We define the positive and negative support of a vector x ∈ RE as
supp+(x) = {e ∈ E | x(e) > 0} and supp–(x) = {e ∈ E | x(e) < 0}.
The inner product 〈·, ·〉 : RE × RE → R is defined through
〈x, y〉 =
∑
e∈E
xeye.
Given a function f : ZE → R∪{−∞}, the effective domain is dom f = {z ∈ ZE | f(z) 6=
−∞}. The effective domain is defined similarly for functions f : ZE → R ∪ {∞}.
Economy and Competitive Equilibrium
There is a set of agents N and a set of heterogeneous goods G. The economy is endowed
with positive or negative2 quantities of goods x¯ ∈ ZG. Typically, in an auction setting,
x¯ will be the vector of goods for sale and in a pure exchange economy, we will typically
have x¯ = 0. Each agent i ∈ N has a valuation function vi : ZG → Z ∪ {−∞} over
bundles of goods (where multiple units of a good are allowed). The interpretation of
vi(x) = −∞ is that bundle x is infeasible. We require that dom vi is finite; this is
a technical assumption which is implicitly satisfied in all settings without producers
(auction environments) and can also be assumed if it is infeasible for producers to
produce infinite quantities of a good. Given linear prices p ∈ ZG, an agent i derives
quasi-linear utility ui(x, p) = vi(x) − 〈p, x〉 from bundle x ∈ ZG. Agent i’s indirect
utility function is defined as
Ui(p) = max
x∈ZG
vi(x)− 〈p, x〉.
We assume that the agents are endowed with a sufficiently high amount of the divisible
good, money, so that they never run into budget problems and can freely choose their
most-preferred bundle at the stated prices. The demand correspondence Di(p) is the
set of maximizers in the expression above.
Definition 1. A competitive equilibrium is an allocation of goods xi ∈ ZG, i ∈ N with∑
i∈N x
i = x¯, together with a price vector p∗ ∈ RG such that xi ∈ Di(p∗) for every agent
i ∈ N .
2Negative endowments are important for the application to the double-track adjustment process by
Sun and Yang (2009), see Section 7.
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Figure 2: Non-existence of competitive equilibria: There is no price such that the
agent demands a quantity of one.
3. Preferences and Discrete Concavity
In settings where only one unit of every good is available and where there is no pro-
duction, the gross substitutes property has turned out to be sufficient for the existence
of competitive equilibria and the design of price adjustment processes. However, when
multiple units of a good are available, this condition is too weak. In this section we
motivate why M \-concavity is a sensible generalization of the gross substitutes con-
dition to our setting. The following is a definition of the gross substitutes property,
naively adapted to multiple units of goods (sometimes also called “weak” or “ordinary”
substitutes):
Definition 2. The valuation vi satisfies weak/ordinary substitutes (wGS)
3 if for every
pair of prices p ≤ p′, and every x ∈ Di(p), there exists some x′ ∈ Di(p′) such that
xj ≤ x′j for every j for which pj = p′j.
To see why this condition is too weak for the existence of a competitive equilibrium,
note that it is vacuous for the case of only one good. See the example in Figure 2 for an
illustration of non-existence of an equilibrium (one good, one agent). The figure suggests
that a form of concavity is required for the existence of a competitive equilibrium. Our
requirement on valuation functions (Assumption 1 below) implies that the function is
concave in the following sense. Also see Figures 3a and 3b for an illustration.
Definition 3. A valuation function vi is concave-extensible if it coincides with its
concave closure
v¯i(x) = inf
p∈RG,α∈R
{〈p, x〉+ α | 〈p, x〉+ α ≥ vi(z) ∀z ∈ ZG}
on the set of integer vectors, i.e., if vi(x) = v¯i(x) for all x ∈ ZG.
When restricted to the unit cube {0, 1}G, there are several properties that are equiva-
lent to gross substitutes: For instance, a valuation function satisfies the gross substitutes
condition if and only if it satisfies the step-wise gross substitutes condition (Danilov,
Koshevoy and Lang 2003):
Definition 4. Valuation function vi satisfies step-wise gross substitutes (SWGS) if for
any p ∈ RG, x ∈ Di(p) and j ∈ G, we either have
3Historically, gross substitution is a condition on the demand correspondence of an agent. However,
through the specific definition of Di above, it can be defined in terms of the valuation function vi. The
same applies to the other definitions given in this section.
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(i) x ∈ Di(p+ δ1j) for all δ ≥ 0 or
(ii) there is some δ ≥ 0 and x′ ∈ Di(p+ δ1j) with x′j = xj − 1 and x′−j ≥ x−j.
The second property which is on the unit cube equivalent to gross substitutes is the
single-improvement property (Gul and Stacchetti 1999):
Definition 5. The valuation function vi satisfies the single-improvement property, if
for every price p, and bundle x /∈ Di(p), there exists a bundle x′ such that ui(x′, p) >
ui(x, p) and x
′ = x+ 1j − 1k with j ∈ supp–(x− x′) ∪ 0 and k ∈ supp+(x− x′) ∪ 0.
Murota and Tamura (2002) show that for general valuation domains, a valuation
function satisfies the single-improvement property if and only if it is concave-extensible
and satisfies step-wise gross substitutes. Therefore, these properties are suitable gener-
alizations of gross substitutes to multiple units of goods.
Assumption 1. For every agent i, the valuation function vi is concave-extensible and
satisfies the step-wise gross-substitutes property. Equivalently, vi satisfies the single-
improvement property.
The interpretation that an agent with a valuation function satisfying this require-
ment views the different goods as substitutes remains valid also for multiple units. First,
on the unit cube, valuations satisfying Assumption 1 are precisely those that satisfy the
gross substitutes property as defined by Kelso and Crawford (1982). Second, for non-
negative goods vectors, these valuations are precisely the strong substitutes valuations
as defined in Milgrom and Strulovici (2009). A valuation satisfies strong substitutes if,
when every unit of every good is treated as a separate good, the valuation satisfies gross
substitutes with respect to them.
It is also known (Fujishige and Yang 2003, Murota and Tamura 2002) that a function
satisfies Assumption 1 if and only if it is M \-concave. These functions form a class of
well-behaved concave functions that play an important role in Discrete Convex Analysis
and exhibit combinatorial properties that allow the design of an iterative taˆtonnement
process. M \-concave functions are introduced in the next section. The reader already
familiar with Discrete Convex Analysis may want to skip that section.
4. Discrete Convex Analysis
In this section we review the main definitions and results from Discrete Convex Analysis.
For a complete and self-contained treatment of the topic we refer the reader to Murota
(2003).
A convex function f with a convex domain in RE has several attractive properties.
First, local optimality implies global optimality. This yields many efficient optimization
methods for convex functions. Second, by the supporting hyperplane theorem, the
subdifferential of a convex function is non-empty everywhere, and the function can be
recovered from the set of subdifferentials. This implies conjugacy and duality results
for the convex conjugate (or Legendre-Fenchel transform) of f . The theory of Discrete
Convex Analysis identifies classes of convex functions defined on a subset of the discrete
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(b) A function that is not
integrally convex, together with
its local convex extension and
convex closure.
Figure 3: Local convex extension, convex closure and integral convexity.
lattice ZE for which discrete analogues of the above properties hold. These will play
an important role in establishing the results in the remainder of this chapter.
The first important property of functions f : ZE → R, which will be shared by the
two subclasses of M \- and L\-convex functions, is integral convexity. It is defined in
terms of suitable convex extensions of f to a real-valued domain. Define the convex
closure f¯ of f as
f¯(x) = sup
p∈RE ,α∈R
{〈p, x〉+ α | 〈p, x〉+ α ≤ f(y) ∀y ∈ ZE}.
This is equivalent to taking the convex hull of the epigraph of f . If the convex closure
coincides with f on the set of integer vectors, i.e., if f(x) = f¯(x) for all x ∈ ZE, f is
called convex-extensible, see Definition 3. We can relax the requirement in the above
definition to obtain a local version of the convex extension: The integral neighborhood
N(x) of x ∈ RE is defined as
N(x) = {y ∈ ZE : ||y − x||∞ < 1}.
If we only impose the inequality 〈p, x〉+α ≤ f(y) for points y in the integral neighbor-
hood of x, we get the local convex extension f˜ of f , which is defined as
f˜(x) = sup
p∈RE ,α∈R
{〈p, x〉+ α | 〈p, x〉+ α ≤ f(y) ∀y ∈ N(x)}
= inf
 ∑
y∈N(x)
λyf(y)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
y∈N(x)
λyy = x,
∑
y∈N(x)
λy = 1, λy ≥ 0
 . (1)
Here, equality of the two expressions follows from linear programming duality (see, e.g.,
Schrijver 1986).
Definition 6. A function f : ZE → R is called integrally convex, if the local convex
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extension f˜ is convex.4 Equivalently, f is integrally convex, if f˜ = f¯ .
The function f is called integrally concave, if the function −f is integrally convex.
A set S ⊆ ZE is an integrally convex set, if its indicator function δS is integrally
convex.
Integrally convex functions share with convex functions the important property that
local minima are also global minima.
Proposition 1. Let f : ZE → R be an integrally convex function and x ∈ ZE. Then
f(x) ≤ f(y) for all y ∈ ZE if and only if f(x) ≤ f(y) for all y ∈ ZE with ||y−x||∞ ≤ 1.
Proof. We only need to show sufficiency. Consider the local convex extension f˜ of f .
From the definition of f˜ in (1) and the local optimality of x with respect to f it follows
that f˜(x) ≤ f˜(y) for all y with ||y−x||∞ ≤ 1. Hence, x is a local minimum of f˜ , which
is convex because of integral convexity of f . Therefore, x is also a global minimum of
f˜ and in particular of f .
While integral convexity is sufficient for the global optimality of local minima, more
combinatorial structure is needed for the conjugacy and duality results we need. Dis-
crete Convex Analysis identifies M \-convex and L\-convex functions as two important
classes of integrally convex functions which are in one-to-one correspondence to each
other under the Legendre-Fenchel transformation.
Definition 7. A function f is M \-convex, if for x, y ∈ dom f and j ∈ supp+(x− y)
(i) f(x) + f(y) ≥ f(x− 1j) + f(y + 1j) or
(ii) f(x) + f(y) ≥ f(x− 1j + 1k) + f(y + 1j − 1k) for some k ∈ supp–(x− y).
A function f is M \-concave if the function −f is M \-convex.
A set X ⊆ ZE is an M \-convex set, if its indicator function δX is M \-convex.
The exchange property (ii) is closely related to the exchange axiom in matroid
theory. Therefore, the M stands for “matroid.”
Definition 8. A function g is L\-convex, if for all p, q ∈ ZG and all α ∈ Z+,
g(p) + g(q) ≥ g([p− α1] ∨ q) + g(p ∧ [q + α1]).
A function g is L\-concave if the function −g is L\-convex.
A set P ⊆ ZE is an L\-convex set, if its indicator function δP is L\-convex.
L\-convex functions are precisely those submodular functions that are integrally
convex. The submodularity of an L\-convex function can be obtained by setting α = 0
in the definition above. Since L\-convex sets are precisely the integral sublattices of
ZE, the L stands for “lattice.”
4Note that integrally convex functions are convex-extensible, but the reverse is not necessarily true.
See Example 3.20 in Murota (2003).
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x1
x2
v(x)
(a) An M \-concave function f .
x1
x2
v(x)
(b) An L\-convex function g.
Figure 4: An integrally concave and convex function. Note that the sets
arg maxx f(x)− 〈p, x〉 and arg minx g(p)− 〈p, x〉 are M \-convex and L\-convex sets,
respectively.
The classes of M \- and L\-convex functions and sets are in many ways dual to
each other. First, the Legendre-Fenchel transform of an M \-convex function is L\-
convex and vice versa. Second, the superdifferential of an M \-concave function is an
L\-convex set, while the subdifferential of an L\-convex function is an M \-convex set.
The superdifferential ∂f(x) of an integrally concave function f : ZE → R ∪ {∞} at
x ∈ dom f is defined as
∂f(x) = {p ∈ ZE | f(y)− f(x) ≤ 〈p, y − x〉 ∀y ∈ ZE}.
Theorem 1. Let f be an M \-concave function with dom f finite. Then
(i) for all x ∈ dom f , the superdifferential ∂f(x) is a non-empty L\-convex set.
(ii) for all p ∈ ZE, the set of maximizers arg maxx{f(x) − 〈p, x〉} is a non-empty
M \-convex set.
An analogue version of the above theorem holds for an M \-convex function and
its subdifferential. The set of maximizers in part (ii) of the theorem are depicted in
Figure 4a on the x1, x2-plane. It turns out that M
\-concave functions are characterized
by either of the properties in Theorem 1.
Define the subdifferential ∂g(x) of an integrally convex function g : ZE → R∪ {∞}
at x ∈ dom g as
∂g(p) = {x ∈ ZE | g(q)− g(p) ≥ 〈x, q − p〉 ∀q ∈ ZE}.
Theorem 2. Let g be an L\-convex function with dom g finite. Then
(i) for all p ∈ dom g, the subdifferential ∂g(p) is a non-empty M \-convex set.
(ii) for all x ∈ ZE, the set of minimizers arg minp{g(p) − 〈p, x〉} is a non-empty
L\-convex set.
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An analogue version of this theorem holds for an L\-concave function and its su-
perdifferential. The set of L\-convex functions is characterized by either of the properties
in Theorem 2.
The concave conjugate or Legendre-Fenchel transform of a function f is defined as
f ◦(p) = inf
x
{〈p, x〉 − f(x)}.
The following conjugacy result holds for an M \-concave function (an analogue result
holds for L\-convex functions).
Theorem 3 (Conjugacy). Let f be an M \-concave function. Then
(i) the concave conjugate f ◦ is L\-concave and
(ii) the biconjugate of f is identical to f itself: f ◦◦ = f .
A special property of M \-concavity is that it is preserved under the following op-
eration (Murota 2003). Define the convolution f1 f2 of two M \-concave functions f1
and f2 through
(f1 f2)(x) = max
x1,x2
{
f1(x
1) + f2(x
2) | x1 + x2 = x}.
We can see from the definition that the effective domain of f1 f2 will be the Minkowski
sum dom f1 + dom f2 = {x = x1 + x2 ∈ RE | x1 ∈ dom f1 and x2 ∈ dom f2}. Since
the convolution is associative, we can for a collection of functions {fi}i∈N , define fN =
i∈N fi. It follows that fN will be M \-concave given that fi is M \-concave for all i ∈ N .
The Legendre-Fenchel transformation and the convolution operator satisfy the rela-
tion
(f1 f2)◦ = f ◦1 + f ◦2 . (2)
5. Competitive Equilibrium
This section is concerned with the existence and properties of competitive equilibria.
As we show below, existence of competitive equilibria is a property of the aggregate
valuation function: If it is concave in the sense that the subdifferential is always non-
empty, then an equilibrium exists for every endowment (also see Baldwin and Klemperer
2013, Danilov et al. 2001). This is always fulfilled for integrally convex functions and
M \-concave functions in particular. For the case of free disposal, we also show that
equilibrium prices will always be non-negative.
The definition of the indirect utility function Ui(p) and the concave conjugate v
◦
i
above implies Ui = −v◦i . Let vN denote the aggregate valuation function of all agents
in N , i.e.,
vN(x) = max{xi}i∈N
{∑
i∈N
vi(x
i)
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈N
xi = x
}
.
This aggregate valuation function is just the convolution of all the agents’ valuation
functions. Then, writing UN for the indirect utility function of the whole group of
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agents, we get
UN = −v◦N = −
∑
i∈N
v◦i =
∑
i∈N
Ui (3)
by (2). As before, the aggregate demand of all agents DN(p) is defined as the set of
maximizers attaining UN(p). This allows us to rephrase the definition of competitive
equilibrium.
Proposition 2. Price vector p∗ is a competitive equilibrium price vector if and only if
x¯ ∈ DN(p∗).
Proof. First, let xi ∈ Di(p∗) and
∑
i∈N x
i = x¯. Then Ui(p
∗) = vi(xi) − 〈p∗, xi〉 ≥
vi(x
i)−〈p∗, yi〉 for all allocations {yi}i∈N ,
∑
i∈N y
i = x¯. Summing up these inequalities
implies
∑
i∈N vi(x
i) ≥ ∑i∈N vi(yi) (cf. First Welfare Theorem) and therefore vN(x¯) =∑
i∈N vi(x
i).
Using (3), we have
UN(p
∗) =
∑
i∈N
[vi(x
i)− 〈p∗, xi〉] = vN(x¯)− 〈p∗, x¯〉,
which implies x¯ ∈ DN(p∗).
Conversely, let x¯ ∈ DN(p∗). We get from the definition of vN an allocation x¯ =∑
i∈N x
i with vN(x¯) =
∑
i∈N vi(x
i). Then we get∑
i∈N
Ui(p
∗) = UN(p∗) = vN(x¯)− 〈p∗, x¯〉 =
∑
i∈N
[vi(x
i)− 〈p∗, xi〉],
where we in turn use (3), x¯ ∈ DN(p∗), and the definition of vN . Since Ui(p∗) ≥
vi(x
i)−〈p∗, xi〉 for all i ∈ N , these inequalities need to hold with equality and therefore
xi ∈ Di(p∗) for all i ∈ N .
The proof also implies that DN(p) is equal to the Minkowski sum
∑
i∈N Di(p), which
is defined as A + B = {a + b | a ∈ A and b ∈ B}. The proposition indicates that the
existence of competitive equilibria is a property of the aggregate valuation function vN .
If it is concave in the sense that for every endowment x¯, the subdifferential at x¯ is non-
empty, then a competitive equilibrium is guaranteed to exist. Since vN is M
\-concave,
this is the case in our setting.
Theorem 4. In the economy defined above, if the valuation function of every agent
i ∈ N satisfies Assumption 1 and x¯ ∈ dom vN , a competitive equilibrium exists.
Proof. Since vi is M
\-concave for all i ∈ N , the aggregate valuation function vN is also
M \-concave. Also note that for p ∈ ZG and x ∈ dom vN , we have x ∈ DN(p) ⇔ p ∈
∂vN(x). By Theorem 1 (i), for M
\-concave functions ∂vN(x¯) is non-empty and therefore
there exists p∗ such that x¯ ∈ DN(p∗), that is, a competitive equilibrium exists.
Remark 1. Theorem 1 also implies that the set of competitive equilibrium prices is an
L\-convex set. In particular this means that it is a lattice.
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Although we do not need to impose free disposal for our results, the following
proposition establishes the intuitive fact that, whenever there is free disposal, prices
are non-negative in equilibrium.
Proposition 3. Assume that vi is non-decreasing for all i ∈ N , that is vi(x) ≤ vi(y)
for x ≤ y. Then for every competitive equilibrium price p∗ we have p∗ ≥ 0.
Proof. We first show that if v1 and v2 are non-decreasing, then v1 v2 is non-decreasing.
Then by induction it follows that vN is non-deceasing. So let x ≤ y and x1 + x2 = x
such that (v1 v2)(x) = v1(x1) + v2(x2). Since v2 is non-decreasing, we have
v1(x
1) + v2(x
2) ≤ v1(x1) + v2(x2 + [y − x]).
Then (v1 v2)(x) ≤ (v1 v2)(y) follows because y = x1 + x2 + [y − x].
Now take j ∈ G and define y = x¯+ 1j. Since p∗ ∈ ∂vN(x¯), we have
vN(y)− vN(x¯) ≤ 〈p∗, y − x¯〉 = p∗j
and therefore p∗j ≥ 0, which completes the proof.
6. Taˆtonnement
Conjugacy between the aggregate valuation and indirect utility function helps us to
easily see that the set of competitive equilibrium prices coincides with the set of min-
imizers of a certain function (Ausubel 2006, Milgrom and Strulovici 2009). Since this
function will be L\-convex, steepest descent algorithms can be used for the computation
of competitive equilibrium prices. In this section, we present such an algorithm and
analyze its convergence properties. We also make use of the fact that the subdifferential
of an L\-convex function determines its slope in certain directions to show how one can
compute the descent direction via the demand sets.
Proposition 4. Price vector p∗ supports endowment x¯ in competitive equilibrium if
and only if it minimizes the function h(p) = 〈p, x¯〉+ UN(p).
Proof. By Proposition 2, a price vector p∗ supports x¯ in competitive equilibrium if and
only if
vN(x¯)− 〈p∗, x¯〉 = UN(p∗) = −v◦N(p∗).
By Theorem 3 (conjugacy) we know that vN = v
◦◦
N and therefore vN(x¯) = infp{〈p, x¯〉 −
v◦N(p)}. Hence, necessity follows since p∗ attains the infimum and therefore minimizes
h. Conversely, if p∗ minimizes h, it attains the infimum and therefore constitutes an
equilibrium price vector.
For general valuation functions, a price that minimizes h is often referred to as a
quasi-equilibrium (Milgrom and Strulovici 2009). Theorem 3 implies that the function
h is L\-convex: It is the sum of a linear and an L\-convex function. In the following we
will present a steepest descent algorithm that minimizes the function h and therefore
constitutes a price adjustment process for the economy considered. The correctness of
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the algorithm follows from the following optimality criterion for the minimization of
L\-convex functions:
Proposition 5. For an L\-convex function h we have that h(p) ≤ h(q) for all q ∈ ZG
if and only if h(p) ≤ h(p± 1S) for all S ⊆ G.
Proof. We only need to show sufficiency. With regard to Proposition 1 we need to show
that h(q) ≥ h(p) for all q ∈ ZG with ||q − p||∞ ≤ 1. Every such q can be written
as q = p + 1X − 1Y for suitable disjoint X, Y ⊆ G. Then submodularity and local
optimality of p imply
h(p) + h(p+ 1X − 1Y ) ≥ h(p+ 1X) + h(p− 1Y ) ≥ 2h(p),
which completes the proof.
It is therefore straightforward to use the following algorithm for minimizing h: Start
with an arbitrary price vector p and search for a subset of goods S and ε ∈ {−1, 1}
such that h(p+ε1S)−h(p) is minimal. If no subset S and ε can be found such that this
difference is negative, p is a competitive equilibrium. Otherwise update the price to
p+ ε1S and iterate. Since we have integer valuations, h decreases by at least 1 in every
step and therefore (since a competitive equilibrium exists) the algorithm converges after
finitely many steps.5 It is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Steepest Descent
1. Pick an arbitrary price vector p ∈ domh = ZG.
2. while there exists ε ∈ {−1, 1} and S ⊆ G with h(p+ ε1S) < h(p) do
3. Choose S, ε such that h(p+ ε1S)− h(p) is minimized.
4. Set p := p+ ε1S.
5. end while
6. p is a competitive equilibrium price vector.
Monotone Convergence
Although we have already seen that the algorithm converges globally, it is often desirable
to have an algorithm that converges monotonically (i.e., for iterative combinatorial
auctions). The following tie-breaking rule implies that if the algorithm starts with a
price that is below every equilibrium price and always sets ε = +1, then it monotonically
converges to the lowest equilibrium price:
Choose the (unique) minimal minimizer S of h(p+ 1S)− h(p). (4)
A unique minimal minimizer exists because h is submodular.
Let p∗ be the lowest equilibrium price (such a price exists since the set of competitive
equilibrium prices is a lattice). Convergence follows if the modified algorithm never
stops strictly below p∗ and always stays below p∗. The former property is a consequence
5In fact, this argument implies the convergence of any descent algorithm.
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of the integral convexity of h; the latter property follows from the tie-breaking rule and
the submodularity of h.
Lemma 1. If the algorithm stops at p, then p ≥ p∗.
Proof. Assume that the algorithm stops at p but p < p∗. Then there exists λ ∈ (0, 1)
such that p′ = λp + (1 − λ)p∗ has the property that ||p′ − p||∞ < 1. The integral
neighborhood N(p′) consists of vectors p+ 1X for subsets X ⊆ G. Since the algorithm
stopped at p, h(p+1X) ≥ h(p) for all these subsets. Hence, by the definition of the local
convex extension, h˜(p′) ≥ h˜(p). But this is a contradiction because h˜(p′) < h˜(p) = h(p)
due to the convexity of h˜, which holds by integral convexity of h.
Lemma 2. If p′ = p+ 1S is chosen by the algorithm at p ≤ p∗ then p′ ≤ p∗.
Proof. Submodularity of h implies
h(p∗) + h(p′) ≥ h(p∗ ∨ p′) + h(p∗ ∧ p′).
Since p∗ is an equilibrium price vector, we have h(p∗) ≤ h(p∗ ∨ p′), and hence h(p′) ≥
h(p∗ ∧ p′). Now assume that there is a j ∈ G with p′j > p∗j . Then p∗ ∧ p′ = p + 1T for
T ⊆ S \ {j}, which contradicts the minimality of S prescribed by the tie-breaking rule
(4).
For instance, if free-disposal can be assumed, then every competitive equilibrium
price is always non-negative and hence the monotone taˆtonnement process can always
be started with a price of p = 0 and converges to the lowest equilibrium price.
We get the following summarizing result:
Theorem 5. If the valuation function of every agent i ∈ N satisfies Assumption 1,
then for every endowment x¯ ∈ ZG and every initial price vector p ∈ ZG, Algorithm 1
converges to a competitive equilibrium price vector.
Further, if the starting price vector is lower than every equilibrium price, then the
monotonic version of Algorithm 1 converges to the lowest competitive equilibrium price.
Eliciting Descent Directions
In practice, for instance when using the taˆtonnement process as an iterative auction,
it is impractical to elicit the values of the indirect utility functions Ui(p) and therefore
impossible to evaluate h(p + ε1S). However, when every agent reports his demand
correspondence Di(p) at the current price p, it is possible to compute the difference
h(p+ε1S)−h(p) for every ε and S (Ausubel 2006). The intuitive reason for this is that
for an L\-convex function h, the difference between the function values at p+ ε1S and
p can be constructed from the subdifferential of h at the point p. The following lemma
demonstrates that this subdifferential corresponds to the set of excess supply vectors.
Lemma 3. For any p ∈ ZN we have x ∈ DN(p) ⇔ x¯− x ∈ ∂h(p).
77
Proof. This is a consequence of the conjugacy between vN and UN . First note that by
the definition of h, we have x¯ − x ∈ ∂h(p) ⇔ −x ∈ ∂UN(p). Next, x ∈ DN(p) is
equivalent to UN(p) = vN(x)−〈p, x〉. Since vN(x) = infq{UN(q) + 〈q, x〉} by conjugacy,
this is equivalent to
UN(p) + 〈p, x〉 ≤ UN(q) + 〈q, x〉 ∀q ∈ ZN .
This is in turn just the definition of −x ∈ ∂UN(p), which completes the proof.
Since h is an L\-convex function, the difference between h(p + ε1S) and h(p) can
be computed via the support function of its subgradient ∂h(p) at p, evaluated in the
direction of ε1S:
Lemma 4. Let g be an L\-convex function, p ∈ dom g and S ⊆ G, ε ∈ {−1, 1}. Then
g(p+ ε1S)− g(p) = max
y∈∂g(p)
〈y, ε1S〉.
For a proof see, for example, Proposition 7.44 in Murota (2003). The difference
h(p+ ε1S)− h(p) can now be computed as follows. By Lemma 3,
max
y∈∂h(p)
〈y, ε1S〉 = max
x∈DN (p)
〈x¯− x, ε1S〉
and therefore, we have established the following proposition:
Proposition 6. Assume that x∗ solves the optimization problem
min
x∈DN (p)
〈x, ε1S〉. (5)
Then, by Lemma 4,
h(p+ ε1S)− h(p) = 〈x¯− x∗, ε1S〉.
The optimization problem (5) can be decomposed by solving minxi∈Di(p)〈xi, ε1S〉 for
every agent separately and then setting x∗ =
∑
i∈N x
i, since the objective function is
linear and DN(p) is the Minkowski sum of the sets Di(p).
6 Also, since the sets Di(p)
are M \-convex, the greedy algorithm provides a way to maximize a linear objective
function over Di(p) efficiently (Dress and Wenzel 1990).
The following example illustrates how the descent direction can be derived from the
demand correspondence for the case of one agent.
Example 1. Assume that there is one agent with the valuation function v depicted
in Figure 5a and that the economy is endowed with x¯ = 2 units of one good. The
corresponding function h(p) = 2p+U(p) is shown in Figure 5b. Let the price adjustment
process start with p = 3. At this price, the agent will demand quantities of either 0 or
1. In accordance with Lemma 3, the subdifferential of h at p = 3 is {1, 2}. Slopes in
6Ausubel (2006) gives a different proof of a version of Proposition 6 which makes use of the single-
improvement property that vN satisfies since it is M
\-concave. Instead, we use the L\-convexity of UN
and h.
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(a) Valuation function used in
Example 1.
p
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8 h(p)
(b) The function h corresponding
to the valuation function on the
left.
Figure 5: Illustration of the relation between demand correspondence and
subdifferential in Example 1.
the direction of −1 and 1 are given by 1 · (−1) = −1 and 2 · 1 = 2, respectively, and
therefore the price should be adjusted downwards. At p = 2, the agent only demands
a quantity of 1 and the price should be lowered further. At p = 1, the agent demands
D(1) = {1, 2, 3}, and the subdifferential of h at p = 1 is {−1, 0, 1}. Since the slope in
the direction of −1 and 1 is (−1) · (−1) = 1 and 1 · 1 = 1, respectively, we know that
p = 1 is a minimum of the function h and that we have found an equilibrium.
At this point we comment on the discrete price adjustment process which is given in
Milgrom and Strulovici (2009). The authors state that their adjustment process, which
is an approximation to a convergent continuous process described by an equation of
motion in continuous time, only requires knowledge of one element of the subdifferential
for any given price. Although the authors give results that there is always a price grid
fine enough (or equivalently, a scaling of the valuation functions high enough) such that
the trajectory of the discrete process lies in an ε-tube around the continuous trajectory,
this does not mean that the discrete process converges. In fact, without knowledge of
the complete demand sets at some price p, it is already impossible to tell whether p is
a market-clearing price.7
While the method described in Proposition 6 can be used to evaluate h(p+ ε1S)−
h(p), it remains to find ε ∈ {−1, 1} and S such that this term is minimized. Since h
is L\-convex and in particular submodular, h(p + ε1S) − h(p) is submodular in (ε, S),
and efficient algorithms for minimizing submodular set functions can be used (Schrijver
2000).
7For instance, in Example 1, if the agent only reports to demand a quantity of 1 at p = 1, the
auctioneer has to conclude that p is not an equilibrium price, although it in fact is.
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Remark 2. If one does not insist on a consecutive price trajectory but instead allows
the ask price to jump around freely, the price adjustment algorithm can be scaled. The
resulting algorithm then finds a competitive equilibrium in strongly polynomial time (see
Murota 2003).
7. Applications
In this section we demonstrate how different models from the literature fit in our frame-
work and how our results can be applied to them.
Ausubel’s Auction for Heterogeneous Goods
In a seminal paper, Ausubel (2006) developed a price adjustment process for auction
settings with indivisible goods where agents’ preferences satisfy the gross substitutes
property. The auction proceeds through the minimization of a Lyapunov function and
the analysis in this chapter is heavily inspired by this. Conversely, Ausubel’s (2006)
auction is an important special case of our adjustment process:
Corollary 1. Assume that agents have valuation functions over the unit cube {0, 1}G
and that the economy is endowed with one unit of each good (x¯ = 1G). Then the
taˆtonnement process outlined in Section 6 describes the discrete price adjustment process
presented in Ausubel (2006).
Thus, our model generalizes Ausubel’s model in that it works for preferences over
arbitrary positive and/or negative quantities of every good, as well as any initial endow-
ment. While positive quantities other than one can be simulated in Ausubel’s framework
by modeling every unit as a separate good, the auction then results in non-linear prices.
In contrast, our algorithm generates linear prices for arbitrary quantities.
Milgrom and Strulovici (2009) also generalize Ausubel to multiple units of goods and
introduce the strong substitutes condition, which, for positive quantities, is equivalent
to Assumption 1. Therefore, our work also generalizes Milgrom and Strulovici (2009)
by allowing for negative quantities and therefore for the possibility to model producers.
Our framework can also be applied to the set of preferences that are used in the
Product-Mix Auction introduced by Klemperer (2010), since these preferences are a
special case of gross substitutes.
Gross Substitutes and Complements
The double-track adjustment process presented in Sun and Yang (2009) is a special
case of the price adjustment process outlined above. We start by recalling the gross
substitutes and complements condition. In the model introduced by Sun and Yang
(2006), the set of goods is partitioned into two sets G = G1 unionsqG2.
Definition 9. A valuation vi : {0, 1}G → R satisfies the weak/ordinary gross substi-
tutes and complements (GSC) condition, if, given some price vector p ∈ RG, some good8
8In this definition, a and b are set to 1 and 2, or 2 and 1, respectively.
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j ∈ Ga, and δ > 0, the following holds: For every x ∈ Di(p) there exists x′ ∈ Di(p+δ1j)
such that for all k 6= j, we have xk ≤ x′k if k ∈ Ga and xk ≥ x′k if k ∈ Gb.
We show that every valuation that satisfies the GSC condition can be transformed
into a valuation that satisfies the GS condition by reversing the sign of every good in
G2. Assume that the goods are ordered such that the goods in G1 come before the
goods in G2. Then the transformation can be described by applying the matrix
M =
(
I|G1| 0
0 −I|G2|
)
,
where I|Ga| is the identity matrix of dimension |Ga|. Using this transformation we
can define the transformed valuation function M∗vi through M∗vi(x) = vi(Mx). The
transformed indirect utility M∗Ui and demand correspondence M∗Di are defined using
the transformed valuation function.
Lemma 5. We have x ∈ Di(p) if and only if M−1x ∈M∗Di(Mp).
Proof. By definition, we have x ∈ Di(p) if and only if vi(x) − 〈p, x〉 ≥ vi(x′) − 〈p, x′〉
for all x′ ∈ dom vi. By substituting x = My and x′ = My′, this is equivalent to
vi(My)− 〈p,My〉 ≥ vi(My′)− 〈p,My′〉
⇔ M∗vi(y)− 〈Mp, y〉 ≥M∗vi(y′)− 〈Mp, y′〉 ∀y ∈ domM∗vi,
which in turn means that y = M−1x ∈M∗Di(Mp).
Proposition 7. Let vi : {0, 1}G → R. Then vi satisfies GSC if and only if M∗vi
satisfies wGS (i.e., is M \-concave).
Proof. First note that wGS is equivalent to a version where the price of only one good
is increased. We show equivalence to this modified definition.
Assume that vi satisfies GSC. Let p ∈ RG, δ > 0 and j ∈ G1. Define p′ = p + δ1j
and let x ∈M∗Di(p). We need to find x′ ∈M∗Di(p′) such that for k 6= j, xk ≤ x′k. By
Lemma 5 we know that y = Mx ∈ Di(Mp). Also, since j ∈ G1, M(p+δ1j) = Mp+δ1j.
Since vi satisfies the GSC condition, we know that there exists y
′ ∈ Di(Mp+ δ1j) such
that for all k 6= j, we have yk ≤ y′k if k ∈ G1 and yk ≥ y′k if k ∈ G2.
We claim that x′ = M−1y′ satisfies the requirements. First, by Lemma 5, x′ ∈
M∗Di(p + δ1j). Now take some good k 6= j. If k ∈ G1 then xk = yk and x′k = y′k
and therefore xk ≤ x′k. If k ∈ G2, then xk = −yk and x′k = −y′k and therefore
xk = −yk ≤ −y′k = x′k.
The argument is similar for the case where j ∈ G2 and also sufficiency can be shown
analogously.
Proposition 7 motivates the following definition of generalized gross substitutes and
complements for multiple units of goods (cf. Baldwin and Klemperer 2013):
Definition 10. Valuation vi satisfies the generalized gross substitutes and complements
(GGSC) condition, if M∗vi is M \-concave.
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With this definition, existence of competitive equilibria follows immediately: For a
set of valuation functions {vi}i∈N that satisfy GGSC and endowment x¯, consider the
modified economy {M∗vi}i∈N with endowment Mx¯. Since {M∗vi}i∈N are M \-concave,
there exists a competitive equilibrium price vector p∗, that is, Mx¯ ∈M∗DN(p∗). Then,
by Lemma 5, x¯ ∈ DN(Mp∗), so Mp∗ is a competitive equilibrium price vector for the
original economy.
We note that the application of our results via the described transformation above
requires us to be able to deal with non free disposal valuations. Specifically, if a val-
uation vi satisfies free disposal then M
∗vi has “anti free disposal” for goods in G2. It
follows as in Proposition 3 that the price p∗j for j ∈ G2 is non-positive, and therefore
Mp∗j is non-negative.
The above transformation also allows us to describe the double-track price adjust-
ment process by Sun and Yang (2006) in terms of the algorithm from Section 6: The
algorithm is run on the modified economy {M∗vi}i∈N and Mx¯ (call it internal repre-
sentation). If we transform this algorithm back to the original economy (call it external
representation), we get the price adjustment process described in Sun and Yang (2009).
In particular,
(i) if the current internal price is Mp, the price p is presented to the agents. If the
internal price for some good in G2 increases, then the external price decreases and
vice versa.
(ii) if an agent indicates that he demands bundle x, then M−1x is used for the internal
calculation of the next price.
(iii) if the monotone convergence algorithm is used internally, the starting price has
to be set such that it is below every competitive equilibrium price. In the original
economy, this means that the price for goods in G1 has to be set to the lowest and
the price for goods in G2 to the highest possible level. Then, since the algorithm
converges monotonically in the internal representation, this means that the real
price for goods in G1 increases whereas the real price for goods in G2 decreases.
(iv) since the set of (internal) equilibrium prices is a lattice, the set of transformed
equilibrium prices forms a “generalized lattice” as defined by Sun and Yang (2009).
Hence, we can formulate the following corollary of Theorems 4 and 5.
Corollary 2. Assume that agents have valuation functions over the unit cube {0, 1}G
and that these valuation functions satisfy GSC. Further, assume that x¯ = 1G. Then, a
competitive equilibrium exists and the procedure outlined above describes the double-track
adjustment process presented in Sun and Yang (2009).
Thus, the results in this chapter generalize Sun and Yang (2006) as well as Sun and
Yang (2009) in that they work for preferences over arbitrary positive and/or negative
quantities of every good, as well as for any initial endowment of the economy, if the
valuation functions satisfy the GGSC condition.
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Trading Networks
The trading networks economy introduced by Hatfield et al. (2013) also fits into our
model. We first describe the network economy and then show how the valuation func-
tions in this chapter relate to the valuation functions as they are defined in Hatfield
et al. (2013).
In the model, there is a set of agents N and a set of trades Ω which can be interpreted
as goods. The agents and trades form a graph, where the nodes are the agents and each
trade is a directed edge. If trade ω = (i, i′) ∈ Ω points from agent i to agent i′ then we
say that agent i is the seller and agent i′ is the buyer in this trade. Let Ωi be the trades
that are adjacent to agent i. Every agent i has a valuation function vi : {−1, 0, 1}Ωi → R
over subsets of adjacent trades. We model agent i being a buyer in trade ω ∈ Ωi by
requiring that for x ∈ {−1, 0, 1}Ωi , vi(x) = −∞ if xω = −1. Similarly, if agent i is a
seller in trade ω we require vi(x) = −∞ whenever xω = 1. The interpretation is that if
agent i demands vector x with xω = −1 then he wants to be engaged in trade ω where
he is the seller and similarly, if xω = 1 then he wants to be engaged in trade ω where
he is the buyer.
We can embed this economy in our model by extending the valuation functions vi to
{−1, 0, 1}Ω as follows: Set vi(x) = −∞ if xω 6= 0 for some ω /∈ Ωi. Otherwise, if xω = 0
for all ω /∈ Ωi, just copy the valuation of the vector x restricted to Ωi. A competitive
equilibrium in the network economy is a competitive equilibrium for the endowment
x¯ = 0. Then we know that, whenever all valuation functions vi satisfy Assumption 1,
there exists a competitive equilibrium and a convergent price adjustment process.
We therefore get the following corollary regarding the model by Hatfield et al. (2013):
Corollary 3. In the model defined above, if the valuation function of every agent sat-
isfies Assumption 1, a competitive equilibrium exists. Further, Algorithm 1 can be used
to find competitive equilibrium prices for any initial price vector p.
In the following we explain how Assumption 1 is equivalent to the full substitutes
condition defined in Hatfield et al. (2013). In their paper, valuation functions, utility
functions, demand, and indirect utility are defined slightly differently as follows: Every
agent i has a valuation function v˜i : {0, 1}Ωi → R that can be embedded into {0, 1}Ω
as described above. Let Ωi→ be the trades adjacent to agent i in which he is a seller
and let Ω→i be the trades adjacent to him in which he is a buyer, respectively. Then
the interpretation is that if agent i demands bundle x and xω = 1 then agent i wants
to be engaged in trade ω. Given price vector p ∈ RΩ, an agent’s quasi-linear utility is
defined as
u˜i(x, p) = v˜i(x) +
∑
ω∈Ωi→:xω=1
pω −
∑
ω∈Ω→i:xω=1
pω.
Indirect utility U˜i and demand correspondence D˜i are then defined as in Section 2, but
using u˜i.
Hatfield et al. (2013) assume full substitutability which is defined as follows:9
Definition 11. A valuation function vi satisfies full substitutability (FS) if for every
two price vectors p ≤ p′ the following holds: For every x ∈ D˜i(p) there exists x′ ∈ D˜i(p′)
9This formulation is similar and equivalent to “indicator language full substitutability.”
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such that whenever pω = p
′
ω for some ω, then xω ≤ x′ω if ω ∈ Ω→i and xω ≥ x′ω if
ω ∈ Ωi→.
We now show that full substitutability and gross substitutability are equivalent. Fix
some agent i. We introduce the following transformation of a vector x ∈ {−1, 0, 1}Ω.
As in the last subsection, assume that the trades are ordered such that trades ω ∈ Ωi→
come first. Then we apply the following matrix:
M =
( −I|Ωi→| 0
0 I|Ω\Ωi→|
)
From the interpretation of the valuation functions vi and v˜i we see that for them to
represent the same preferences over trades, vi(Mx) = v˜i(x) has to hold for all x ∈
{0, 1}Ω.
Lemma 6. For transformed bundles we have Mx ∈ Di(p)⇔ x ∈ D˜i(p).
Proof. This follows from ∑
ω∈Ωi→:xω=1
pω −
∑
ω∈Ω→i:xω=1
pω = −〈p,Mx〉
and vi(Mx) = v˜i(x).
Proposition 8. A valuation v˜i satisfies FS if and only if the corresponding valuation
function vi satisfies Assumption 1.
Proof. On the unit-cube, Assumption 1 is equivalent to the ordinary (weak) gross sub-
stitutes condition. After applying the translation v′i(x) = vi(x − 1Ωi→), dom v′i is the
unit-cube. Since the gross substitutes condition is translation-invariant, it is therefore
enough to show that v˜i satisfies FS if and only if vi satisfies weak GS (Definition 2).
In order to prove necessity assume that v˜i satisfies FS. Take price vectors p ≤ p′ and
x ∈ Di(p). By Lemma 6 we know that Mx ∈ D˜i(p). Since v˜i satisfies FS, we know that
there exists Mx′ ∈ D˜i(p′) such that whenever pω = p′ω for some ω, then Mxω ≤ Mx′ω
if ω ∈ Ω→i and Mxω ≥ Mx′ω if ω ∈ Ωi→. Hence, for ω with pω = p′ω we have xω ≤ x′ω.
Furthermore, x′ ∈ Di(p′) and therefore x′ satisfies all requirements in Definition 2.
Sufficiency is proved similarly.
Combining the transformationM with the translation v′ in the proof above yields the
same transformation as that which is used in the proof for the existence of competitive
equilibria in Hatfield et al. (2013). However, the translation is not needed in our model
since our framework can deal with negative amounts of goods (that is, producers).
We can also use our framework to extend the model in this subsection to multiple
units of goods in each trade. Further, the transformation in the last subsection on the
gross substitutes and complements condition can be applied to the trading network
model to get two sets of trades Ω1 and Ω2 where trades in the same sets substitute each
other but trades in different sets are complements (see also Drexl 2013).
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8. Discussion
We have used the theory of Discrete Convex Analysis to unify and generalize the lit-
erature on taˆtonnement for economies with indivisibilities. The interpretation of the
auction procedure proposed by Ausubel (2006) as a steepest descent algorithm of certain
discrete convex functions yields simple and intuitive proofs of the convergence proper-
ties of the generalized adjustment process. Applying the results demonstrates that all
the literature on discrete taˆtonnement harnesses the notion of gross substitutability,
which is equivalent to M \-convexity. The theory of Discrete Convex Analysis confirms
that M \-convexity is essential for many properties of discrete convex functions.
Since the existence of market-clearing equilibria can be guaranteed for classes of
valuation functions that are much more general than the valuations we consider (see
Baldwin and Klemperer 2013), one of the big open questions is whether a price adjust-
ment process can be designed that converges for every instance of valuation functions
where equilibria are guaranteed to exist. While the indirect utility function in these
cases is still convex, it does not exhibit all the combinatorial properties used in the
present chapter. Still, it might very well be possible to prove convergence of a suitably
designed descent or gradient algorithm that minimizes the aggregate indirect utility
function.
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